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Abstract
Religious land use disputes are characterized by high levels 
of conflict and the potential to seriously undermine social 
capital in affected communities.  Contemporary land use 
procedures reflect an antiquated heritage and reliance upon 
adversarial means that are inadequate to successfully resolve 
these socially complex local conflicts.  While there are 
practical obstacles, mediation holds advantages over these 
existing procedures in terms of dispute resolution, and has 
greater potential to preserve and build social capital at the 
local level.  This article examines the theoretical justification 
for mediation in this context, and argues for moving beyond 
the status quo. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the name of religious freedom, the federal government has 
reversed the traditional deference accorded to local government land use 
decisions.  By enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),2 Congress has shifted the balance of 
power between individuals and groups who claim religious reasons for the 
use of their real property and the communities in which they are embedded, 
setting the course for an unprecedented clash of religious values and 
community interests.  Whatever one may think of the wisdom of this new 
course, it raises the question of how well the traditional system of local land 
use regulation is designed to resolve disputes involving religious values. 
While rare in the past, religious land use disputes have become 
widespread since the adoption of RLUIPA.  That statute provides an 
exemption from state and local government zoning or landmarking laws 
where they “substantially burden” the religious exercise of individuals, 
groups, or institutions, unless the law or imposition of the law is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.3 In addition to imposing a regime of strict 
judicial scrutiny of local land use decisions, RLUIPA also awards attorneys 
fees to successful litigants,4 putting religious land use claims on a par with 
traditional civil rights litigation.  Because religious persons—if not religious 
congregations—are present everywhere people reside, and because 
relatively few parcels of land used or potentially used for religious purposes 
remain free of zoning restrictions, the likelihood of such disputes arising is 
high. 
The prospect of gaining an exemption from zoning regulations, 
 
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.  The land use provisions of the statute apply to both 
zoning and historic landmarking laws, and while I mostly refer to the former in my 
analysis, the impact of RLUIPA on historic landmarking disputes is the same and my 
analysis is intended to apply to those as well.  As the name of the statute suggests, 
however, a portion of the statute pertains to the rights of institutionalized persons, such as 
prisoners.  These latter provisions were recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court against 
an Establishment Clause challenge.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005).  That 
decision, however, specifically reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the land use 
provisions that are the focus of this article. 125 S.Ct. at 2118, fn.3. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).  In addition, RLUIPA contains three “categorical” 
prohibitions, preempting zoning and landmarking laws which: 1) treat religious assemblies 
or institutions on “less than equal terms” compared to nonreligious assemblies or 
institutions; 2) discriminate on the basis of religion or religious denomination; or 3) totally 
exclude or unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a 
jurisdiction.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
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along with the tempting prospect of attorneys fees if litigation follows, 
provides religious land owners an almost irresistible incentive to assert 
claims of religious discrimination if they face opposition to their use or 
proposal, if only to gain strategic leverage in the land use approval process.5
Not surprisingly, a large variety and number of claims have been filed under 
RLUIPA in the short time since its passage.6 And it is likely that where 
such disputes arise, they will consume an inordinate amount of time, 
energy, money, and social capital7 in these communities. 
Land use disputes that involve claims of religious freedom touch on 
some of the most contentious and difficult challenges of civic life.  They 
raise the complex issue of how best to reconcile the concerns and 
imperatives of religiously motivated individuals or institutions with the 
interests of their neighbors, and the interests of the communities in which 
they exist.8 These conflicts contain a significant potential to create social 
 
5 In this article I mostly refer to the land use approval or permitting process, in which 
property owners seek the right to commence a new use on their property.  However, many 
religious land use disputes involve enforcement actions, where the local zoning authority is 
seeking to halt or modify an existing use of the property that it alleges to be out of 
conformance with applicable zoning requirements.  See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Com'n of 
Town of New Milford, 289 F.Supp.2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003), vacated as unripe, 42 F.3d 342 
(2nd Cir. 2005) (challenging Town’s cease and desist order issued to halt Sunday prayer 
meetings held in home in single family residential neighborhood). My analysis extends 
equally to both contexts, but for convenience I will mostly refer to the former. 
6 Advocates as well as scholars have attempted to track litigation filed under RLUIPA 
since its enactment.  One public interest law firm involved in bringing RLUIPA keeps a 
running list of such cases on its web site.  Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, at 
http://www.rluipa.com/cases/court_cases.html (last checked March 27, 2006).  While the 
courts could eventually strike down or all or parts of RLUIPA, the analysis set forth here 
will remain pertinent to the smaller universe of constitutional—as opposed to statutory—
claims of religious discrimination in land use disputes. 
7 Professor Ackerman defines social capital as “the connections between individuals 
that build social networks.” See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together:  Conflict 
Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 27, 28 (2002) 
(citing ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 19 (2000)). 
8 Richard Schragger has captured well the opposing views: 
To Congress and the law's supporters, RLUIPA is necessary to prevent 
local governments from discriminating against particular religions (or 
religion in general) by limiting religious congregations' ability to build or 
expand places of worship. The charge is that localities enforce religious 
bigotry through the strategic use of often vague and standardless land-use 
ordinances and development processes. To its critics, RLUIPA is a 
dramatic interference with local power to enforce generally applicable 
zoning rules and an unnecessarily broad exemption that allows religious 
organizations (and no others) to flout a community's reasonable land-use 
concerns. 
Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of 
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divisions lasting long after a particular dispute has settled.9
The question addressed in this article is whether existing systems for 
processing religious land use claims are well suited to the task.  The 
conclusion is that they are not, and that local officials and others involved in 
religious land use disputes ought to consider employing mediation at an 
early stage.  The main virtue of mediation in this context is the opportunity 
it provides for disputants to meet face-to-face in an effort to understand—
even if they do not agree with—the views of others.  A facilitated meeting 
of persons with differing perspectives is precisely what is missing from the 
traditional systems of land use decision making, which, like the litigation 
process, is adversarial in nature and designed to keep separate rather than 
bring together those who disagree.  Significant by-products of using 
mediation are the potential for increasing social capital in the community, 
and developing additional capacity within the community for problem-
solving and healthy dispute resolution practices.  These outcomes are likely 
to produce stronger and more vibrant communities. 
Part I of this article examines the existing system for resolving land 
use disputes, why it is generally ill suited to the task of effectively resolving 
religious land use disputes.  Part II describes the contentious cultural 
climate around issues of religion in our country, and how, as a product of 
that larger debate, RLUIPA has the potential to bring divisive religious 
disputes to every community in America.  Part III looks more closely at the 
debate in the scholarly literature about the place of religion in public 
discourse, speculates concerning the challenges these issues present to local 
efforts to resolve religious land use disputes, and argues that mediation 
provides a good model to promote useful public dialogue in the midst of 
such disputes.  Finally, part IV discusses concerns about and challenges to 
using mediation in these situations.  
 
I.  THE ADVERSARIAL CHARACTER OF LOCAL LAND USE PROCEDURES 
Parcels of real property are unique and highly local by definition, 
and local zoning regulations tend to reflect this and exhibit a tremendous 
variability from one jurisdiction to the next.10 The idiosyncratic nature of 
 
Religious Liberty, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1810, 1839 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
9 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 59 (“communities that have been the focus of … 
adjudicated zoning battles often require years to mend their wounds.”). 
10 This lack of uniformity is troubling for many, especially in the developer 
community, and there have been periodic calls for the development and adoption of more 
uniform laws and regulations.  See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Carrie Richter, Out of the 
Chaos:  Towards a National System of Land-Use Procedures, 34 Urb. Law. 449 (2002) 
(recommending reform of “the current Balkanized systems of planning”); Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Model Legislation for Land Use Decisions, 35 Urb. Law. 635 (2003) 
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local regulations creates tension with any jurisprudential or regulatory effort 
to exert a centralizing or unifying influence on, or supervision over, land 
use decision making.  In the effort to assure accountability for local land use 
decisions while at the same time respecting democratic principles, judicial 
decisions and state-wide planning legislation have created a system of land 
use disputing that draws its inspiration from the adversarial and 
adjudicatory model of the courtroom. 
As the size and complexity of the nation grew during the twentieth 
century, local officials increasingly saw the need for systematic community 
land planning and regulation.11 There also arose a recognition—at least in 
urban areas and among urban planners—that communities face uniquely 
local challenges and opportunities relating to growth, and therefore some 
measure of discretion ought to be left to local officials to negotiate, in the 
context of specific land use proposals or issues, for the optimal distribution 
of benefits and burdens from development.12 That discretion, however, 
creates a fundamental concern from the perspective of law and democratic 
governance, concern both as to the proper amount of discretion and the need 
to police concerns about civil rights, property rights, accountability, fairness 
and due process.   
In response, both the courts and state legislatures have imposed 
upon local zoning officials a “quasi-judicial” model of decision-making 
aimed at: 1) curbing abuses of discretion when local authorities adjudge 
development proposals; and 2) facilitating subsequent judicial review.13 
(reviewing the American Planning Association’s model code for zoning procedures). 
11 Sullivan & Richter, supra note 10, at 451-54. See also, Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, 
and Dealing:  The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 337, 340-44 (2002) (reviewing history of land use planning in the 
United States). 
12 See Ryan, supra note 11, at 349 (arguing that land use decision-making has grown 
increasingly discretionary and “has shifted from the planned to the particularized, affording 
a more ad hoc response to individual development proposals.”). 
13 See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:  Piecemeal Land Controls as Problems 
of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 837, 850, 867 (1983).  In this article, Professor Rose 
describes how the adjudicative model and the concomitant prescription of courtroom-like 
procedures arose from parallel developments in the field of administrative law.  Id. at 844-
53.  From this premise, she argues that fundamental differences distinguishing large 
governmental bureaucracies from local governments—such as the idea that an 
administrative agency would possess a certain focus and expertise—were overlooked, and 
the resulting jurisprudence of local land use decisions tends to misconstrue the nature and 
benefits of local decision-making.  She concludes that local land use decisions are best 
understood as efforts to mediate between private and public interests in the use of real 
property.  Even in the administrative law context, however, many see the need for more 
collaborative forms of decision-making.  See, e.g. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating 
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982)  (explaining arguments for the 
explicit recognition of private interests and the incorporation of direct negotiations with 
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Thus, formal public hearings may involve published and mailed notices, 
issuance of subpoenas, the administration of oaths, the right to present 
testimony and cross-examine witnesses, submission of written evidence and 
arguments, a record of the hearing, issuance of a formal written decision, 
and the right to an administrative appeal.14 Typically, not all of these 
elements are present, and often they are not evident to the public.  On the 
whole, public hearings in land use matters retain a structured formality 
calculated to keep opponents separated, talking only to the decision makers 
and not to each other.   
To capture a sense of how this process embodies explicit and 
implicit adversarial values and assumptions, it is useful to describe in detail 
what transpires in a typical public hearing.15 Just as in a courtroom, the 
participants and members of the public attending a zoning hearing sit facing 
forward towards the individual or panel that is charged with deciding the 
matter.  They are expected to remain largely silent unless making a formal 
presentation up at the podium designated for speakers.  The podium is 
usually situated at the head of the public seating area, and the speaker has 
his or her back to the audience while addressing the decision makers.  After 
the agency’s planning staff provides a staff report, the proponent of the 
application is invited to give a presentation concerning the details of the 
proposal.  Aside from word of mouth, this is often the first glimpse of the 
project for those in the audience, and for many it may be their first 
experience with the formal zoning process.16 
After these initial presentations and any follow up questions from 
the decision makers, people in the audience are invited to address issues 
concerning the project under consideration.  If it appears that more than a 
few persons intend to speak, a strict time limit of 3-5 minutes is usually 
employed to keep things moving.17 Occasionally there will be a follow up 
 
interested parties into the administrative agency rulemaking process in the case of difficult 
and contested proposals). 
14 See Sullivan & Richter, supra note 10, at 474. 
15 There is, of course, much variety in public hearings with respect to the physical 
layout of the hearing room as well as the form and formality of the proceedings.  The 
following sketch is intended to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive, in its description. 
16 Persons more familiar with the zoning process may know that plans and other 
application materials can be viewed at the planning department at certain times of the day, 
and that they can ask for the assistance of a planning department employee to answer 
questions about the project.  But even for these persons, work or other obligations may 
prevent them from doing so.  For the very few people who are savvy, concerned, and have 
the time to do so, a written letter sent well in advance of the hearing is often the most 
effective way to voice their concerns, as is direct contact with agency staff involved with 
the processing of the application, when that option is available. 
17 Public hearings of local zoning boards or city councils are typically held on weekday 
evenings, and the agenda will often include many other items of business including other 
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question from a member of the decision making body, but for the most part 
they will, at best, sit listening impassively.18 Thereafter ensues a period of 
discussion solely among the decision makers, which is often just a series of 
statements for public consumption intended to justify the vote the member 
expects to cast when all the speeches are over.  The last formality will be 
the vote, after which the decision making body quickly moves on to the 
next matter on its agenda or goes home. 
This more or less tightly choreographed bit of public theater is 
frequently the only time that proponents and opponents of the project are 
together in the same room.  There are no opportunities, much less 
invitations, to engage in a dialogue to explore the mutual interests and 
concerns of those in attendance.  Everything said and done is in the nature 
of performance and advocacy, calculated to cajole and persuade.   And if 
the stakes are high, it is likely to devolve into little more that a lengthy 
shouting match, complete with cheers and jeers from the audience.   
In the end, responsibility for the decision is left to the elected or 
appointed decision makers.  In general, these decision makers are not 
planning or technical experts able to easily sift through the competing 
arguments and seize upon the logically and legally relevant morsels.  
Rather, this is a group of mostly well-intended community volunteers who, 
with the help of their underpaid and overworked staff, have the difficult job 
of weighing arguments and discerning the correct legal standards for 
application to the issues for decision.19 
In sum, there is very little about the public hearing process that is 
designed, intended, or well suited to promote the sort of thoughtful dialogue 
and deliberation that commentators have argued is necessary to successfully 
 
public hearings.  These meetings can run late into the evening, and the participants often 
feel pressed for time. 
18 For anybody expecting that decision makers will be held rapt by a speaker’s 
eloquence, the recent case of Lacy Street Hospitality Service, Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles,125 Cal.App.4th 526, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 805 (2004), offers an admittedly extreme, but 
nonetheless cautionary, tale. In that case, the court held that an applicant seeking 
modification of zoning restrictions applicable to its adult cabaret business was denied the 
right to due process when the City Council failed to pay attention during the applicant’s 
presentation.  125 Cal.App.4th 530-31.  The offending behavior of the City Council 
members, captured on videotape, included talking on their cell phones, eating, talking with 
aides, reading, and one “especially peripatetic” member who walked back and forth from 
one side of the council chambers to the other consulting with various colleagues.  Id. at 
529-30.  The court noted that the council members also failed to pay attention during the 
testimony of opponents to the application.  Id.
19 Professor Rose argues that the only type of expertise these local officials are likely 
to have is political expertise, which creates tensions with the assumptions about 
impartiality that are central to the adjudicative model of decision making.  Rose, supra note 
13, at 869. 
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navigate the difficult terrain of religion in public discourse.20 Particularly 
for members of the public, the press of time and lack of access to both 
information and to decision makers leaves them frustrated and with little 
choice but to fire away using their strongest claims and objections.21 
The process of land use decision-making reaches its denouement, 
then, in a public hearing resembling a dramatic courtroom battle, with 
advocates making impassioned pleas to a third party decision maker. 22 But 
for some commentators—admittedly a step removed from the battlefield—
what feels like a trial to its participants can be more usefully understood as 
the final session of a protracted bargaining process.  In fact, taken as a 
whole, the land use decision-making process resembles to them nothing so 
much as mediation.23 That theoretical lens lends support to the prescriptive 
thesis of the present argument, which is that actually using mediation offers 
a promising alternative for the resolution of religious land use disputes. 
More than twenty years ago, at the dawn of the modern alternative 
dispute resolution era, Carol Rose argued that courts would do well to view 
the land use process as a form of mediation between the private and public 
 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 26-31. 
21 Cf. Jayne E. Daly, What’s Really Needed to Effectuate Resource Protection in 
Communities, 20 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 189, 205 (2002) (“At a public hearing, residents are 
invited to comment on pending decisions, however, their ‘input’ is often too late to be 
meaningfully incorporated.  Additionally, the public’s reaction to the proposal is often 
presented in an exaggerated fashion because of fear that local officials will not take their 
concerns seriously.”)  The commentator, a practitioner on the front lines of community 
disputes, argues that citizens’ experiences with the public hearing process may explain 
survey data finding a relative distrust of city and county government zoning decisions.  Id.
22 A recent press report, while not involving RLUIPA, well illustrates the dynamics at 
play in public hearings involving religious issues.  According to the San Diego Union-
Tribune, 350 people—“most of them Christians”—showed up at a San Diego City Council 
hearing on whether to remove a large cross from the top of Mt. Soledad.  The 29-foot tall 
cross has stood on a 5-foot base on city-owned property at the top of  the mountain 
overlooking the city since 1954.  It has been the target of legal actions by (persons 
identified in the article as) “atheists” since 1989.  After 16 years of litigation, including a 
decision by the 9th Circuit in 2002, the city had no recourse left against an injunction 
requiring it to take down the cross.  At what was described as an “emotional hearing,” one 
person opposed to removal was quoted as telling the council:  “We will either prevail 
before this City Council to maintain the cross in its current location, or we will prevail in 
the 2006 and 2008 elections.  It is not the jurisdiction of this City Council to negotiate 
away our religious freedoms.  The Mount Soledad cross is non-negotiable.”  See Matthew 
T. Hall, No Clemency for Cross, S.D. Union-Trib., March 9, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 
WL 3785333. 
23 See Rose, supra note 13, at 889 (arguing that “piecemeal” zoning decisions—the 
small, ad hoc determinations concerning individual parcels or properties, a category that 
encompasses the bulk of religious land use disputes—“are far more realistically perceived 
as mediative than quasi-judicial.”).  See also Ryan, supra note 11, at 357 (stating that a 
“mediation model is more realistic and less distorting”). 
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interests in land, rather than as an adjudication of property rights.24 Her aim 
was primarily theoretical and jurisprudential, but Professor Rose 
acknowledged the possibility of employing mediation in this context.  
“Anthropological literature, and, increasingly, modern legal literature,” she 
wrote, “suggest negotiation and particularly mediation as an alternative 
dispute-resolving model especially appropriate at the local or sub-local 
level.”25 
Rose points to the mixed public and private interests which co-
habitate in any given parcel of land, and argues that local government—
through its land use regulations and procedures—mostly acts in a mediative 
role, looking to find the best accommodation of these oft-competing 
interests.26 Individuals serving on local elected and appointed zoning 
bodies, she argues, are not trained to dispassionately apply abstract rules of 
decision to competing property rights-based claims in a predictably 
disciplined process, and these bodies thus are not otherwise particularly 
competent to act as neutral judicial-like councils.27 
Yet courts insist that local governments act more judicially when 
making decisions about individual land uses proposals, and this creates 
unintended consequences along with predictable efforts to evade these 
restraints.  Local officials have shown an “irrepressible inventiveness” in 
finding ways to preserve or increase their discretion in land use decision-
making.28 In this way, local governments have retained a significant ability 
to bargain ad hoc when presented with a land use proposal.  Often that 
negotiation happens behind the scenes and is not readily apparent to local 
residents.  It takes place in the form of various one-on-one contacts and 
other meetings between applicants and the local government’s professional 
and technical staff, local officials, motivated citizens, and perhaps staff 
from other government agencies.  Most such negotiating is a response to 
differing views about the requirements of applicable local, state, and federal 
 
24 Rose, supra note 13. 
25 Id. at 888-89.  While Professor Rose’s analysis has not yet found a home in modern 
land use jurisprudence, one recent commentator has argued that subsequent advances in 
scholarship and theorizing of dispute resolution have only strengthened the appeal of her 
arguments.  See Ryan, supra note 11, at 357-59 (calling Rose’s work “the most convincing 
theoretical analysis of the necessary role of bargaining in local land use decision-making”). 
26 Rose, supra note 13, at 887-88 (stating that development proposals “pit the 
proponent of change against the interests of neighborhood property owners or some larger 
segment of the community”). 
27 See supra note 19, and accompanying text.  Rose argues that the insistence on 
judicializing land use “at once asks too much and too little” of local governments:  too 
much in supposing that they can plan their futures well enough to develop fair and useful 
guidelines for adjudicating future land use proposals; and too little in accepting that they 
will apply these speculative and vague guides in a fair and impartial manner.  Id. at 881. 
28 Id. at 879-80. 
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regulations, or in connection with the environmental review process, if any.  
By the time the proposal reaches its last act in the public hearing, most if 
not all such negotiations are complete or abandoned, and a more or less 
final package is presented to the decision making body for a yes or no vote. 
This opaque quality of the land use process poses a difficult 
challenge for efforts to promote a healthy civic discourse around religious 
land use disputes.  Many citizens directly impacted by and most passionate 
about a dispute will feel shut out of the decision making, and may 
conclude—not without some justification—that the result was pre-ordained.  
Their only opportunity to express support, opposition, or any other concerns 
or feelings may be a two or three minute presentation, during an emotional 
hearing and before a packed audience, where some will be too intimidated 
to make any public statement.29 
Similar to a formal judicial proceeding, participants in such a public 
hearing must address their arguments to a purportedly disinterested and 
neutral third party, and are not encouraged to speak to one another.  The 
proceedings have a formal quality, and speakers are told to raise and discuss 
only a narrow range of legally and factually relevant arguments.  After the 
vote on the matter, some will walk away feeling vindicated while others 
will feel they have lost or been victimized. 
Contrast this public hearing scenario with that of a mediation 
involving the same religious land use dispute.  The key discussions and 
negotiations would directly involve all interested parties, though 
representative spokespersons would likely be selected to organize and make 
more efficient the actual bargaining aspects of the mediation.  With the 
assistance of a skilled mediator or facilitator, participants would be invited 
to express their concerns in a structured but collegial and more informal 
environment.  The local zoning authority would be represented and 
participate as an interested party, but also with the understanding that it 
retains formal responsibility to review and approve any proposal that is 
reached as a result of the mediation.  Much time and effort would be spent 
to ensure that participants understand—even if they do not agree with—the 
views and concerns of others.  Also, the scope of issues and concerns 
addressed in the mediation would not be strictly limited to those considered 
relevant by the state legislature or the courts.  Rather, the idiosyncratic 
issues of the dispute and the needs of the individuals and community 
 
29 In addition to the pressures of time and emotions, many people also suffer from a 
fear of public speaking that will discourage them from voicing their thoughts and concerns.  
Choosing not to speak may deprive them of the cathartic benefit which often accompanies 
self-expression, and may deprive others of the benefit of that person’s viewpoint, including 
information that might influence the decision making process. 
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involved could addressed, in addition to the more abstract and technical 
concerns found in local zoning regulations. 
This type of mediation allows the community to work out a difficult 
issue in a neighborly fashion.  Passionate feelings can be expressed, but 
there is ample opportunity—and, with the assistance of the mediator, the 
skills and techniques necessary—to foster the sort of discussion and 
understanding necessary to bridge the divide among participants.  
Consensus solutions can be explored absent the imminent threat of a 
decision being imposed by a third party.  If consensus is reached, the 
participants walk away with the knowledge that they arrived at their own 
decision in a principled and fair fashion.  The resulting consensus sends a 
strong message to the ultimate decision-making body about what the 
community feels is an appropriate resolution and an appropriate distribution 
of benefits and burdens resulting from the decision.30 
In contrast to the adjudicatory approach to resolving religious land 
use disputes, mediation is more likely to foster a climate of fully-engaged 
and respectful deliberation among the parties most affected by the use in 
question, and to create or increase tolerance and understanding among 
members of the community with differing religious concerns and 
commitments.  Additionally, effective citizen participation in dispute 
resolution mechanisms at the community level may enhance a community’s 
capacity for disputing productively and spur increased levels of social 
capital, both of which encourage a more robust civic life and well-
functioning democracy.31 
The divisive nature of religious conflict is both the impetus for the 
argument that religious land use disputes are ideal candidates for mediation, 
and the primary challenge facing those who undertake such an effort.  For 
this reason, it is worth looking more closely at the larger social and cultural 
forces that led to the enactment of RLUIPA, and how they manifest at the 
local level in the form of religious land use disputes.  This issue is examined 
next. 
 
II.  CULTURE WARS AND THE NEW WAVE OF RELIGIOUS LAND USE DISPUTES  
30 See, e.g., Gus Bauman, Land Use Mediation:  Negotiation with Municipalities to 
Get Project Approval without Litigation, SF08 ALI-ABA 519, 525 (2000) (“a mediated 
plan is not likely to be rejected by the locality or taken to court by neighbors).  Mediation 
should not wholly supplant the public hearing and formal decision making processes of the 
local zoning authority.  See infra note 119 and accompanying text. But local governments, 
while retaining formal authority to approve or deny a project, will have a strong incentive 
to adopt the consensus solution reached in a mediation in which it participated, if only 
because the other parties will hold that expectation. 
31 See infra Part III.C. 
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The interplay of religion and public policy is the subject of n 
vigorous debate in contemporary American society.32 There is the litany of 
causes—prayer in public schools, abortion, display of religious symbols on 
government property, gay marriage, and others—that seem to continually 
test our capacity for reasoned deliberation and tolerance for diversity.33 
After the last presidential election, the airwaves, newspapers, and 
the Internet were saturated with stories about religion and its influence on 
electoral (and judicial) politics.34 In the year-end holiday season that 
followed, the usual battles over placement of religious symbols on public 
property were subsumed in a broader debate about putting “more Christ into 
Christmas.”35 It seems these days that every public issue with religious 
 
32 See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, Reconstructing the Public Square, 24 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 2025, 2026 n.6 (2003) (“controversies over the appropriate limits of Church and State 
have gained a ferocious intensity over the past quarter of a century”); Alberto B. Lopez, 
Equal Access and the Public Forum:  Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and 
Establishment, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 167, 169, 169 n.5 (2003) (collecting recent newspaper 
articles and asserting that concern about separation of church and state “permeates public 
discourse”).  Issues of church and state are also contested abroad, though perhaps with less 
acrimony.  See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Letter from Europe; Italy’s Church and State:  A Mostly 
Happy Union, N.Y. Times, December 1, 2004, at A4, available at 2004 WLNR 12606835 
(describing the effects of the established church on the social and political life of Italy, and 
exploring similar themes in other western European nations). 
33 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious 
Liberty:  The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1047, 
1070-73 (1996) (arguing that political changes in the 1960’s lead to political organizing 
and activism among evangelical Christian groups, resulting in “bitter national debates” 
with liberal and Jewish interest groups). 
34 See, e.g., Frank Rich, 2004:  The Year of ‘The Passion,’ N.Y. Times, December 19, 
2004, Section 2, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 14330194 (reporting that immediately after 
the election NBC’s “Meet the Press” and ABC’s “This Week” Sunday talk shows featured 
religious leaders discussing religious values and electoral outcomes). 
35 The Associated Press recently reported on a nationwide effort to highlight the 
Christian meaning of Christmas, providing notable examples of activism including an 
effort to boycott major department stores that have replaced “Merry Christmas” with 
“Happy Holidays” signs in their windows, and reporting that one organization, the Alliance 
Defense Fund, has a list of 800 lawyers “waiting in the wings” to litigate these matters.  
Allen G. Breed (Associated Press), Christian Conservatives Say it’s 'Christmas’ time; 
Their Election-induced Push Against “Holiday” and “Season” Greetings Draws Support, 
Concern, Philadelphia Inquirer, December 15, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL 
103345658 (“Emboldened by their Election Day successes, some Christian conservatives 
around the country are trying to put more Christ into Christmas”). Id. There were the usual 
assortment of disputes over religious symbols, as well.  See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, 
Evangelicals Use Courts to Fight Restrictions on Christmas Tidings, Washington Post, 
December 20, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL 101231741 (reporting several disputes 
over Christmas trees on public property, the singing of carols in schools, inclusion of 
mangers in public school plays, and the like); Julie E. Bisbee (Associated Press), Pulled 
Nativity Irks Voters in Oklahoma, Orlando Sentinel, December 19, 2004, at A3 (reporting 
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implications is hotly contested.36 
While the political rhetoric heated up in Washington, D.C.,37 most 
actual disputes involving religion are and continue to be played out at the 
local level, in communities and schools.38 Not surprisingly, religious land 
use disputes are highly localized.39 Thus, when Congress enacted RLUIPA 
 
that voters in Mustang, Oklahoma, defeated two school bond measures in retaliation for the 
decision of the school administration to remove a nativity scene from a school Christmas 
Program). 
36 Former Reagan appointee Clint Eastwood, interviewed about accusations aired on 
political talk shows that his Oscar-winning film, Million Dollar Baby, was intended to 
promote euthanasia, expressed frustration at the current cultural and political climate: 
‘I never thought about the political side of this when making the 
film,’ Mr. Eastwood says. He is both bemused and concerned that a 
movie with no political agenda should be construed by some as a polemic 
and arouse such partisan rage. ‘Maybe I'm getting to the age when I'm 
starting to be senile or nostalgic or both, but people are so angry now,’ he 
adds. ‘You used to be able to disagree with people and still be friends. 
Now you hear these talk shows, and everyone who believes differently 
from you is a moron and an idiot - both on the right and the left.’ 
Frank Rich, How Dirty Harry Turned Commie, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2005, Section 2, 
at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 2040605. 
37 See, e.g, Will Lester (Associated Press), Right Wing Set to Press Agenda; Supreme 
Court Vacancies Would Get Top Priority, The Columbian, January 2, 2005, at A10, 
available at 2005 WLNR 94687 (reporting that in the aftermath of President Bush’s 
reelection, “[s]ocial conservatives want to push for a federal ban on gay marriage, new 
restrictions on abortion and rollbacks of laws limiting a church’s participation in politics”); 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Evangelical Leader Threatens to Use His Political Muscle Against 
Some Democrats, N.Y. Times, January 1, 2005, at A10, available at 2005 WLNR 22492 
(reporting that “James C. Dobson, the nations most influential evangelical leader, is 
threatening to put six potentially vulnerable Democratic senators ‘in the bull’s-eye’ if they 
block conservative appointments to the Supreme Court.”). 
38 See, e.g, Sara B. Miller, In Schools and Cities, Battles over ‘Christ’ in Christmas,
Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 58698416 
(noting that “years of lawsuits [have] caused schools and local governments to pull back 
from” traditional forms of celebration of Christmas); cf., Schragger, supra note 8, at 1811 
(“Much of the Supreme Court’s modern Religion Clause doctrine has been forged in 
conflicts that directly implicate the traditional powers of local governments: primary and 
secondary education, land use, police powers”). 
39 The courts have long recognized that land use regulation is a “quintessentially” local 
matter.  See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Com’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348-49 (2nd Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “land use disputes are uniquely matters of local concern more aptly suited for 
local resolution,” and citing similar decisions from other circuit courts of appeal); see also,
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good:  The True Story Behind the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 Ind. L. J. 311, 353 (2002) (hereinafter, 
Hamilton, Federalism). As Professor Hamilton, a prominent critic of RLUIPA, explains: 
Land use law has always been a creature of state and local law. The 
reason for this is three-fold. First, the permanent nature of land—its 
immovability—makes its uses far more relevant to those who are nearby 
than those who are far away. Second, how land is used is an essential 
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it took an unprecedented step into local waters,40 and the result has been a 
wave of religious land use disputes in communities nationwide.41 To better 
understand the consequences of what Congress has done, it is helpful to 
briefly review the emergence of RLUIPA from the broader battles involving 
the Free Exercise Clause in the courts and in Congress.42 
The events leading to the enactment of RLUIPA demonstrate that 
this national debate over religion has now filtered down to local 
communities in the form of religious land use disputes.  Between 1960 and 
1990, beginning with the decisions in Sherbert v. Verner,43 and then 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,44 the Supreme Court began to back away from a bright 
line distinction between religiously motivated actions and religious beliefs, 
and on occasion invoked a balancing test requiring the government to 
justify a substantial burden imposed on a person’s religious practice.45 
Then, in 1990, a divided court in Employment Division v. Smith declared 
“an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with 
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,” 
igniting a debate concerning the history and meaning of the Free Exercise 
 
ingredient for communities to develop their character and to pursue 
shared purposes.  Land use law is one of the key ways that communities 
come together to set priorities, to establish their character, and to meet 
fiscal, aesthetic, and lifestyle needs. Third, by keeping land use law local, 
citizens have more direct access to their representative (than if those 
representatives were national) and a proportionally larger voice in the 
land use process that directly affects them. Land use law is enacted by 
the state and local governing bodies and implemented by locally elected 
or appointed boards, with publicized public hearings an integral 
component in altering the law and in applying it. 
Id. at 335 (footnotes omitted). 
40 See Schragger, supra note 8, at 1839 (“RLUIPA is, in essence, the first national 
land-use ordinance.”). 
41 Id. at 1839 n.121 (compiling RLUIPA decisions).  See, also, Allison B. Cohen, 
Neighbors Divided; A Religious Land-use Law Designed to Protect Institutions Fuels Some 
Zoning Disputes, L.A. Times, April 25, 2004, at K1, available at 2004 WL 55908541 
(estimating there were 50 active RLIUPA cases nationwide). 
42 For a comprehensive look at this history, see Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39. 
43 374 U.S. 393, 403 (1963). 
44 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1971). 
45 The distinction between actions and beliefs was set out in the Supreme Court’s first 
Free Exercise case, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), affirming the bigamy 
conviction of a Mormon.  See, generally, ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 21.7-21.8 (3d. ed. 1999); Alan C. Weinstein, Land Use 
Regulation of Religious Institutions:  Balancing Planning Concerns with Constitutional 
and Statutory Safeguards for Religious Freedom, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND 
EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 150-51 (Daniel R. Mandelker 
& Rebecca L. Rubin, Eds., 2001). 
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Clause.46 
Fearing that important constitutional guarantees had been 
undermined, religious groups intensively lobbied Congress to step in and 
restore what they felt had been lost.47 Their efforts bore fruit initially with 
the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 
which was explicitly aimed at overturning the result in Smith by 
incorporating the strict scrutiny standard from Sherbert.48 However, RFRA 
was quickly invalidated in City of Boerne v. Flores, when the Court held 
that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.49 
After the Boerne decision, the Religious Liberty Protection 
Act of 1998, followed by the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, 
were introduced into Congress.  Both bills were substantially similar to 
RFRA, in that they applied broadly to state and federal regulations and 
actions of every kind, although this time Congress was mindful to claim 
authority under its Spending and Commerce powers, in addition to the 
enforcement power under Section 5.  In the latter of these two bills, 
Congress for the first time inserted language specifically relating to land use 
regulation.  It justified these new provisions by declaring that land use 
regulation “lacks objective, generally applicable standards, and instead 
relies on discretionary, individualized determinations,” and stated that 
Congress was responding to “the established evidence of discriminatory 
land use regulations based on Congress’ remedial power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to the Court’s directive in Boerne.”50 
46 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). In Smith, the Court held that a criminal law banning the 
use of peyote was valid even though it was applied to deny unemployment benefits to 
members of the Native American Church who used peyote for sacramental purposes and 
were dismissed from their jobs in a private drug counseling program for using an illegal 
drug.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that the right of free exercise of 
religion does not relieve individuals of the obligation to comply with valid, religiously 
neutral laws of general application.  Much criticism has focused on the Supreme Court 
itself.  See, e.g., Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace:  Establishments, 
Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 333, 333-
338 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence is plagued by 
“inconsistencies [which] have prompted serious concerns about the Court's competency in 
resolving church-state problems”). 
47 See Schragger, supra note 8, at 1835-36. 
48 Id. RFRA is found at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b) (1993), and provides as follows: 
“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of further that 
compelling governmental interest.” 
49 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the application of RFRA to a local 
historic landmark dispute involving property owned by the Catholic Church).  
50 H.R. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999).  Critics have disagreed with these conclusions, 
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Significant opposition arose to these bills, however, and neither passed.51 
After these legislative efforts failed, a few members of the sponsoring 
coalition persevered, introducing a compromise bill retaining only the land 
use elements plus a provision regarding “institutionalized persons.”  That 
bill, RLUIPA, passed Congress and was signed into law by President 
Clinton, effective September 22, 2000.52 
RLUIPA places the religious discrimination claims of owners or 
users of real property on par with traditional civil rights litigation.  It creates 
an exemption for religious land users to all state and local government 
zoning or landmarking laws when such laws substantially burden religious 
exercise, unless the law furthers a compelling governmental interest and is 
the least restrictive means of doing so.53 RLUIPA reverses the long-
established presumption of validity and respect traditionally accorded the 
decisions of local planning and zoning officials, and, together with the 
threat of large attorneys fees awards, has created an atmosphere where 
many counties, cities, and towns accede to the demands of potential 
plaintiffs who can assert religious reasons for the use or proposed use of 
their property.  In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
pursued RLUIPA enforcement actions against local jurisdictions in 
conjunction with suits by religious congregations, putting additional 
pressure on these communities to settle rather than pursue legal claims.54 
Because RLUIPA potentially applies to any person or organization 
that uses real property for a religious purpose, the statute creates a large 
spectrum of possible objections to zoning regulations.  Each dispute will be 
unique, involving a different parcel of property, different religious acts and 
purposes, different sets of zoning regulations, different communities, not to 
mention different personalities.  Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some 
typical, recurring themes thus far in religious land use disputes:   
 
 Locating in commercial and industrial areas. Churches55 will 
 
arguing that Congress made no effort to investigate and understand the nature of land use 
regulation, and that it failed to establish (as required by the Boerne decision) a pattern of 
widespread religious discrimination in land use regulations or activities.  See, e.g., 
Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39, at 335-52. 
51 Hamilton, Federalism, supra note 39, at 335-52. 
52 Id. at 334. 
53 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000cc(a)(1).  RLUIPA also imposes certain related categorical 
prohibitions in the regulation of religious exercise.  See supra note 3. 
54 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. Takes Up a Little Church’s Zoning Fight, N.Y. 
Times, July 4, 2003, at A14, available at 2003 WLNR 5170419 (reporting that DOJ had 
initiated enforcement proceedings in conjunction with a RLUIPA action brought by a 
religious congregation against the County of Maui, Hawaii). 
55 The use, in this article, of the term “church” may refer either to the community of 
religious practitioners or the physical structures associated with their use of a site, or both, 
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often attempt to locate in depressed commercial areas or even 
shopping centers where land values and rents are low.  Local 
governments and local merchants, who argue that having major 
noncommercial uses in commercial areas will thwart efforts to 
reinvigorate and grow the commercial district and the local 
economy, sometimes oppose these efforts.56 
 Expansion in residential zones. Existing churches in residential 
zones are often small, but may wish to expand the scope and 
intensity of their activities, or expand their physical facilities to 
accommodate growth in membership.57 The historic model of 
small community-oriented churches has become outdated in 
recent years; many churches are quite entrepreneurial (for 
example, renting facilities for receptions and other social 
gatherings), and have a full calendar of events throughout the 
week.  Many have active and varied ministries involving 
religious education and daycare, feeding and housing the 
homeless, substance abuse rehabilitation, counseling, or shelters 
for abused persons.  Yet many communities have not updated 
their planning regulations in response to these societal changes, 
and others find themselves constrained because they are older, 
“built-out” communities, limited in their ability to change 
historic development patterns. 
 Use of Single Family Residences. A recurring dispute under 
RLUIPA involves religious groups or individuals seeking to use 
single-family homes in single-family neighborhoods for their 
religious activities.  Neighbors of such uses often are concerned 
about the loss of residential character that can accompany the 
conversion from residential to religious use.58 
 Religious Schools. Another common situation has been the 
siting or expansion of schools associated with religious 
 
and should be understood to include similar institutions such as temples and mosques. 
56 See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F.Supp.2d 1083 
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (congregation sought to locate to a commercial district). 
57 See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F.Supp.2d 1186 
(D. Wyo. 2002) (church in a low-density residential area sought permit to operate an on-
site day-care facility). 
58 See, e.g., Murphy v. Zoning Com’n of Town of New Milford, 289 F.Supp.2d 87 (D. 
Conn. 2003) vacated as unripe, 402 F.3d 342 (2nd Cir. 2005).  In Murphy, a couple living 
at the end of a cul-de-sac hosted regular prayer meetings involving as many as 50-60 
guests. The town issued an order limiting the number of attendees to 25, the homeowner 
sued, and the court granted an injunction against the town, finding that the town’s actions 
violated RLUIPA.  The injunction was subsequently vacated on appeal to the Second 
Circuit, on ripeness grounds. 
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organizations.59 Whether small or quite large, as some are, 
religious schools feature all the same impacts as other schools, 
including traffic, large events, noise, morning and evening 
hours, and they frequently draw objections from neighboring 
residential uses. 
 
As the above examples suggest, religious land use disputes usually 
involve individuals or groups who are part of a larger community, but are at 
cross-purposes with some in that community.  To give a better sense of how 
mediation might work in such situations, consider a hypothetical example of 
the first type of dispute described above, where a long-established 
congregation in a residential neighborhood seeks to remodel, modernize, 
and expand its facilities.  The congregation submits an application to 
remodel its sanctuary and expand the seating area for religious services, to 
build a new multi-purpose room for meetings and receptions or other events 
involving up to five hundred people, to construct two additional classrooms 
for the existing preschool, and to provide fifty additional parking spaces.  
The plan also calls for new lighting and additional landscaping.  In addition, 
the operational plan proposes to expand the hours of operation until 10 p.m. 
on weekdays and midnight on Fridays and Saturdays, an increase in the 
frequency of the congregation’s religious services, as well as an increase in 
the use of facilities by outside organizations.  The proposal also includes a 
plan to increase preschool enrollment by one-third. 
The application comes before the city’s planning commission for an 
initial public hearing to consider the potential environmental impacts of the 
project.  Project opponents include a group of nearby residents who have 
just created an informal neighborhood association to represent their views 
and concerns to city officials. The hearing draws a standing room only 
crowd, roughly split between opponents and supporters, the latter including 
many congregation members.  From the testimony, it is clear that the 
project has been carefully conceived and is very important to its supporters.  
They believe it is urgently needed to ensure the future well being of the 
congregation and their ability to pursue their religious mission.  It is 
likewise clear that the nearby residents have legitimate concerns about the 
impact the project will have on their lives.  
The congregation believes that without improvements to its decades-
old facilities, strained as well by the gradual growth in the size and 
activities of its membership, they will be unable to meet the needs and 
expectations of their members for a vital and relevant ministry.  The 
 
59 See, e.g., Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F. 3d 183 (2nd 
Cir. 2004) (Orthodox Jewish day school with enrollment of 470 sought to construct 25 
additional classrooms and a multi-purpose room on existing site). 
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neighbors, on the other hand, already have concerns about the amount of 
traffic and the number of activities occurring in what they see as an 
otherwise quiet residential enclave, and they view the expansion plans with 
even greater concern. They anticipate increased levels of traffic and noise to 
be generated throughout the day and into the night each day of the week, 
adversely affecting the character of their neighborhood and lowering 
property values. 
At the hearing, the planning commissioners allow for two hours of 
emotional presentations before concluding the public testimony.  In the 
discussions that follow, several commissioners are clearly uncertain about 
how to proceed, and express concern both for the needs of the congregation 
and for the interests of the residents.  Two commissioners state that they 
would like to see more analysis on nighttime noise impacts, weekend traffic 
volumes, along with additional details on the landscaping plans and an 
alternative daily schedule for the preschool.  Ultimately, the commission 
votes to delay any decision until its next meeting, and asks its staff to 
provide additional information at that time. 
At this particular moment in our hypothetical dispute, there is a 
good opportunity to intervene using a mediated process.  A concrete land 
use proposal is on the table, the opposition to that proposal has surfaced, 
and the important interests and issues have been identified.  Yet it is still 
early enough in the process that positions have only just been aired, 
remaining tentative and subject to discussion and subject to the 
development of further information.  Importantly, no public allegations of 
religious animus or discrimination have been made—at least not yet.  The 
city, being the regulatory authority charged with making the decision on the 
application, may be in the best position to persuade the parties to try 
mediation.  A planning department staff member who is familiar with the 
process might informally discuss the possibility with persons on each side 
of the dispute, including the representatives of the congregation and the 
lawyer for the newly formed neighborhood association.  Alternatively, an 
independent public policy mediator might be asked to conduct an 
assessment of the dispute to determine the prospects for a successful 
mediation, what the key issues are likely to be, and who the critical 
stakeholders are that should be invited to participate in the mediation. 
If a mediation process is thereafter convened, a face-to-face dialogue 
among the various interested parties—at a minimum, representatives of the 
applicant, the residents, and the city—can begin.  In this dialogue the parties 
will have a full opportunity to present their concerns in a setting conducive 
to respectful listening and reasoned discussion.  The benefits of the 
mediation setting are due in part to the presence of a skilled neutral who has 
gained the trust of the parties along with a commitment to try and 
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understand each others’ views, but also due to the absence of a packed 
hearing room and the imminent threat of an adverse decision hanging over 
the proceedings.  Under such circumstances, the parties are better able to 
explore areas of mutual interest and agreement, to clarify areas of 
disagreement or matters that require the development of further 
information, to seek compromise on some matters and win-win solutions on 
others, and, at a minimum, gain a better understanding of each other’s 
needs, concerns, and viewpoints.    
It seems likely in our hypothetical that, after having the opportunity 
to sit down and discuss the issues with the aid of the mediator, the 
congregation’s representatives will quickly see that the opposition of 
surrounding residents stems from their fear of the impacts of the proposed 
development, and is not the result of religious animus.  Likewise, 
neighborhood representatives will better understand the needs and 
motivations driving the proposal, and this mutual understanding can provide 
the basis not only for a creative resolution but also for productive future 
relations.   In contrast to this scenario, if mediation is not considered and the 
congregation’s application is either denied or approved with unacceptable 
conditions, the scene is set for a RLUIPA claim.  Where an administrative 
appeal is available or required, the congregation may begin to lay the 
groundwork for a legal challenge by asserting that the city’s regulations—
either on their face or as applied by the planning commission—violate 
RLUIPA.  And once this rights-based dynamic asserting religious 
discrimination firmly takes hold, the stakes become higher and the dispute 
will become much more difficult to entangle—even for the most skilled 
mediator.  With each allegation, insinuation, or even suspicion of religious 
animus, community ties will be strained or broken, and the community’s 
social fabric further distressed. 
In summary, despite the potential for an acceptable resolution and 
even mutual benefit in such disputes, if they devolve into claims of religious 
discrimination there is a significant risk of harm to the affected 
neighborhoods and communities.  The next part examines this contention 
more closely, focusing on the difficulties we, as Americans, experience 
when attempting reasoned discussion and deliberations over public issues 
involving religion, and why it is important that we find a way to do so. 
 
III.  RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
A.  The Risk of Polarization in Arguments over Religion 
 
In general, people who live in the same community will share many 
concerns about environmental planning issues.  These common interests 
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both contribute to and provide an impetus for harmonious relations.  
Disputes over traffic, noise, and aesthetics may generate a few impassioned 
speeches, but are not frequently bitter and divisive in the long term.  It is 
much less likely, however, that a community will share common views 
about religion to the same extent.  Even people who share the same faith 
may give religious considerations a very different priority when it comes to 
land use issues that affect them personally. 
With the passage of RLUIPA, disputes that once focused on 
mundane planning issues such as traffic, noise, and aesthetics, become 
contests over religious freedom and the place of religion in a liberal 
democracy.  Not only are there likely to be divergent views as to the 
religious claims involved, but also there will be a tendency to engage in a 
zero-sum contest of wills over these issues.  Land use applicants who assert 
religious reasons for the use of property gain the possibility of an exemption 
from the zoning laws that apply to everybody else, and at the very least 
obtain tremendous leverage from the highly credible threat of imposing 
litigation costs and an award of attorney’s fees.60 Few, if any, such 
applicants can be expected to forego the strategic advantage of a religious 
discrimination claim.   
The transformation of a land use dispute into a civil rights claim of 
religious discrimination is problematic because it carries a significant risk 
of polarization between the parties and in the community.61 Of course, 
heated accusations and divisive partisanship are not limited to religious 
issues, as anybody who has witnessed a public hearing over a controversial 
land use matter can attest.  But religion implicates core identity issues, 
reliably causing disputants to act and react in defensive and sometimes 
 
60 For example, according to a recent press report from the city of Ontario, California, 
a congregation that had sought to build a new church settled their dispute with the city on 
favorable terms once they had amended an existing complaint to include a RLUIPA claim.  
Brenda Gazzar, Church Lawsuit Settled, Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, February 10, 2005.  
City planners and neighbors had opposed the new church, citing concerns about traffic, 
parking and disruption of economic plans for that area. Id. “I think the RLUIPA claim 
changed the complexion of the case,” noted an attorney with a national organization who 
had assisted the congregations with its RLUIPA claim, “That’s when the city wanted to 
talk settlement.” Id. The City Manager of Ontario opined that the $150,000 the city agreed 
to pay “was a good settlement because our attorneys certainly believed it was likely that the 
city could lose the case, and that we could have to spend far more than what we settled 
for.”  Id. A member of the city council agreed, pointing out that, as he understood 
RLUIPA, “there is no way the city can legally keep them from locating wherever they 
please.” Id.
61 Professor Lipkin argues that religious arguments create a “Tower of Babel” of 
political debate, that it “paradoxically personalizes and objectifies political debate, and…is 
altogether too powerful for democratic purposes.”  Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 n.9 and 
accompanying text. 
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extreme ways.62 Like disputes involving race and ethnicity, disputes that 
divide along religious lines are particularly volatile and prone to 
expressions of bigotry and hatred, leading in some instances to the use of 
intimidation and violence.63 As Professor Nagel has stated about religious 
argumentation in the context of the abortion debate: 
It is so urgent and one-sided as to leave no room for broader 
perspective or compromise. It makes opponents into enemies 
and thus induces both hatred and a sense of futility. Worse, 
these defects are progressive, for extreme moral claims of 
this kind can be answered only by ratcheting up the intensity 
of argumentation. As charges fly back and forth, even the 
very basic inhibition against using falsehoods begins to drop 
away. 64 
In summary, RLUIPA is likely to bring religious discrimination 
claims front and center in many land use disputes.  Having previously 
asserted that mediation is better suited to dealing with this difficult issue 
than the current system of land use dispute resolution, the next section looks 
more closely at the highly contested debate over religion in the public 
square, and how that debate both makes clear the depth of the problem 
identified, but also contains the seeds of a responsive approach to resolving 
these disputes.  
 
B.  Religious Arguments in Public Discourse 
 
A vigorous theoretical debate has accompanied the public shouting 
over politically charged issues touching on religion, such as abortion, 
school prayer, and the display of religious symbols on public property.  The 
debate concerns the propriety of religious arguments in deliberations and 
decisions about legislation and public policy.65 Some legal commentators 
 
62 See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 Cardozo Stud. L. 
& Literature 1, 12 (2000) (“Issues concerning gender, race, and religion are laden with 
emotion because they touch the sense of self.”). 
63 The volatility of ethnic and religious conflict is perhaps more tragically evident 
elsewhere in the world.  See, e.g., VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO 
ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997) (examining the role of ethnicity and religion in violent conflicts 
around the world from the perspective of group identity formation and psychoanalytics). 
64 ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 159 (2001) (quoted 
in Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 n.9).  Of course, the concern about extreme 
argumentation is not limited to religious or even moral arguments, and may occur in almost 
any context where a proponent aggressively pursues a position despite the lack of 
acceptance by opponents of the argument’s premises.  Conflicts touching on religion seem 
particularly prone to this form of adversarialness, however. 
65 See. e.g., Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2026 n.1 (compiling scholarly books and articles 
on this issue). Lipkin divides the “warring factions” in this debate into the “inclusionists,” 
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advocate for explicit recognition of religious moral values as the basis for at 
least some government legislative and policy actions, pointing to “the 
founders’ anchoring of American humans right upon sovereign 
presupposition of a Creator.”66 Others tread more carefully around 
Establishment Clause objections to the use of religious justifications for law 
and policy, arguing that a “law that coincides with moral teachings of some 
religion does not establish that religion.”67 
For those who assume that such public discourse is or ought to be a 
brawling, wide-open affair, it will come as something of a surprise that 
there is any controversy at all.68 In any case, it is clear that many believe 
that religious voices have been stifled or excluded from the debates over 
legislation and policy.69 
Assuming religious arguments are being excluded, why would 
reasonable citizens seek to bar any sincerely held views from public 
debates, even if founded in religious beliefs?  A frequent target of 
inclusionists is political theorist and philosopher John Rawls,70 who sought 
 
who welcome religious arguments, and the “exclusionists,” who seek to limit debate to 
secular arguments only.  Id. at 2025. 
66 Douglas W. Kmiec, Oh God! Can I Say That in Public?, 17 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics 
& Pub. Pol’y 307, 312 (2003).  Professor Kmiec further explains his view that such 
explicit recognition was intended to protect individual liberty from the power of the state:  
“Anchoring basic rights upon a metaphysical source is very much part of that structural 
separation, for without God, the law is invited to become god.”  Id. at 313. 
67 Laycock, supra note 33, at 1082 (discussing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 
(1980)). 
68 See. e.g., Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2033 (“According to the conventional view in 
American politics, the public square should be unrestricted and include robust, vigorous 
debate.”). 
69 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the 
Death Penalty, 17 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics &  Pub. Pol’y 541, 546 (2003) (“That religious 
believers should be speaking at all is, as it turns out, hardly less contested than the 
substance of what we are called to say.”). Others dispute this claim, however.  Professor 
Blumoff, for example, argues that “‘God-talk’ enjoys a robust and seeming omnipresence 
in our public life.”  Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New Religionists’ Newest Social Gospel:  
On the Rhetoric and Reality of Religions’ ‘Marginalization’ in Public Life, 51 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 1, 6 (1996).  “As an empirical matter,” Blumoff notes, “there is indisputable evidence 
of both the prevalence and the influence of religious organizations on public policy.”  Id. at 
14.  In contrast, he asserts, “not a shred of empirical evidence supports the claim that 
religion has in fact been marginalized.”  Id. at 10 
70 See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Framing the Public Square God’s Name in Vain:  The 
Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics, 91 Geo. L. J. 183, 185 (2002) (book review) 
(calling the work of Rawls the “leading source” for such arguments); Garnett, supra note 
69, at 546 (identifying Rawls with this position); Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) 
Enlightenment?, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1263, 1279 (2004) (calling Rawls “the most 
influential contemporary American theorist” associated with the effort to distinguish the 
religious from the secular in political and democratic discourse).  According to Professor 
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to describe a theory of democracy in a pluralistic society that was just and 
stable.   
Rawls held that just and acceptable laws and public policy will be 
possible in areas of “overlapping consensus” where citizens agree on certain 
essential features of their democracy, and therefore citizens should only rely 
on political arguments that might reasonably appeal to all citizens.71 The 
chief enemy of such a democracy is, in this view, fundamentalism—
whether religious or philosophical—or what Rawls referred to as  
“comprehensive doctrines.”72 Rawls’ formulation sprang from the 
recognition and acceptance of a politically and religiously plural society.73 
From that premise, he argued that it is not reasonable for some citizens to 
impose any one comprehensive doctrine on others.74 Thus, arguments that 
rely on religious texts for their authority are, in this view, politically 
unreasonable because they would not appeal to all citizens in a democracy 
where religious freedom and pluralism are taken seriously.75 Such 
arguments, accordingly, result in incommensurate discourse and a 
 
Lipkin, “Rawls’s notion of ‘public reason’ is an exclusionist view and relies on a notion of 
‘reasonableness.’” Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2045 n.74. 
71 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Fundamentalism From the Perspective of Liberal 
Tolerance, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631, 1632 (2003) (summarizing and defending Rawls’ 
support for excluding “politically unreasonable” arguments from public discourse).   
72 Id. at 1632-34.  According to Professor Griffin, Rawls stated his objection to 
religious arguments as follows:  “How is it possible for those holding religious doctrines, 
some based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible, to hold at the 
same time a reasonable political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional 
democratic regime?”  Id. at 1632, (quoting JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)).  
73 Id. at 1632. 
74 Id.
75 Professor Greenawalt also makes this point, highlighting what he sees as the danger 
of allowing such arguments: 
If freedom of religion exists, diverse religious views are bound to 
emerge and continue; religion engenders such strong passions that it will 
inevitably be a source of tension; and that tension will be aggravated by 
reliance on religious grounds in political decisions and arguments. 
Relatedly, social unity in liberal democracies will always be fragile 
enough so that argument in terms of nonaccessible grounds will be 
harmful. 
KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 130 (1995), 
quoted in Annette Bulger Mathis, Comment, Judges, Thou Shalt Not Use Thine Own 
Religion In Thy Opinions, 23 Miss. C. L. Rev. 131, 132 (2004).  Cf., Martha Minow, On 
Being a Religious Professional:  The Religious Turn in Professional Ethics, 180 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 661, 672 (2001) (noting “the incendiary effects of governments and political actors 
mobilizing people around political differences in places such as Bosnia, Israel, and 
Northern Ireland.”). 
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breakdown of the deliberative aspects of civic debate.76 
Suffice it to say that the debate over the role of religion in public 
discourse has been long and passionate, and the competing inclusionist and 
exclusionist viewpoints will not be easily reconciled.77 Undaunted by this 
challenge, Robert Lipkin offers what he calls his “reconstruction thesis.”  
Professor Lipkin argues that all sides in a reasonable democratic debate 
must, after initially stating their views on the issues, “reconstruct” their 
respective arguments; this step, he says, is an effort “to formulate, in a 
common framework or discourse, different and sometimes 
incommensurable perspectives.”78 
Stated more plainly, Lipkin’s idea is that all participants must be 
allowed to present their views in whatever terms they see fit, but after doing 
so they must next be prepared to “reconstruct” their arguments in a manner 
and in a language which is accessible to others—if not, “the conversation 
abruptly comes to an end.”79 This obligation does not apply just to those 
holding religious viewpoints and concerns, of course.  Those who do not 
share, or give a different priority to, particular religious concerns may also 
need to reconstruct their own arguments so that those with religious 
 
76 See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2027 (arguing that religious arguments can “create a 
divisive ‘Tower of Babel’ of political debate, and tend to stop meaningful political debate 
dead in its track.”).  Cf. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 Ariz. St. 
L. J. 473, 480 (1997) (summarizing John Dewey’s views, and stating that Dewey believed 
“there can be no search for the truth when persons merely shout at each other.”). 
77 Nor is it not my purpose here to take sides in or reconcile the various arguments.  
Rather, I am concerned here with how, in the context of religious land use disputes, people 
with different views might best attempt to resolve their conflict.  I suspect that many 
political actors on both sides in this debate, along with at least some legal commentators, 
pay little attention to the question of reconciliation. There are, after all, potential 
advantages to be obtained by encouraging division, including the hope of gaining a more 
complete victory.  With this same concern in mind, Professor Lopez warns that “the 
division of citizens into religious factions that ‘vex and oppress’ one another for political 
ends exacts a substantial toll on society because the clash inevitably creates winners and 
losers based upon the number of adherents, information, wealth, or the like.”  Lopez, supra 
note 32, at 174 (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961)).  
78See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2029. 
79 Id. at 2073.  Lipkin adds:  “This impasse prompted Richard Rorty to characterize 
religious arguments as ‘conversation-stoppers.’ The reason religious discourse can be a 
conversation-stopper is not because the non-religious citizen arbitrarily refuses to continue, 
but because the parameters for continuing are totally obscure.”  Id. at 2073 n.174 (citing 
Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 Common Knowledge 1, 2 (1994)).  
And if no attempt is made to bridge such divides, Professor Minow warns us, “the 
prospects for communication across different groups grow very dim, and the occasions for 
using religious authority as a club—of both the weapon and social variety—jeopardizes 
equality, participation, and mutual exchange.” Minow, supra note 75, at 686. 
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viewpoints and concerns can understand them.80 
Lipkin provides several examples of reconstructed rhetoric from the 
oratory of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr..  Dr. King’s messages, he 
argues, were aimed at other Christians, but also at other religious-minded 
individuals and secular audiences as well.81 Though filled with religious 
language and references, King’s was “a universal ethical discourse,” which 
spoke of the reciprocal duties of each citizen towards the mutual benefit of 
all.82 Even statements utterly shorn of religious references, such as King’s 
“I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be.  And 
you can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be,” 
reverberate powerfully with common ethical and moral concerns.83 
What is of primary interest here is that Lipkin’s notion of 
reconstruction—his response to the quandary of religious argumentation—
has a direct parallel in mediation.  Parties in mediation enter into a dialogue 
whereby they attempt to reach an understanding of their differences, and 
then seek to resolve them.  This effort requires that the parties, with the aid 
of the mediator, attempt to describe their point of view in a way that can be 
understood, if not accepted as true, by the other disputants.  This concerted 
attempt to restate and to explain—to reframe, in the mediator’s parlance—is 
similar to Lipkin’s notion of reconstruction, and is likewise aimed at 
establishing common ground or a common language upon which the parties 
can then seek an acceptable resolution. 
The analogy to mediation is especially clear in the way Lipkin 
describes the stages of political justification in a democracy.  According to 
Lipkin, these are:  1) the presentment stage, a “[n]o holds barred” exchange 
of views among all-comers; 2) the reconstruction stage, the attempt to state 
these views in “a common language with shared principles of reasoning”; 3) 
the argument stage, where options for resolving the issues identified during 
the first two stages are considered and contested; and 4) the judgment stage, 
where the decision is made on a course of action, stated in terms 
understandable to all. 84 
Lipkin’s stages closely parallel the structural elements of mediation 
as commonly described by theorists and practitioners.85 Following 
 
80 See Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2073. 
81 Id. at 2043. 
82 Id. at 2043-44. 
83 Id. at 2043 (quoting from Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a 
Great Revolution, in A KNOCK AT MIDNIGHT: INSPIRATION FROM THE GREAT SERMONS OF 
REVEREND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 205, 208 (Clayborne Carson & Peter Holloran eds., 
1998)). 
84 Id., at 2051-52.  
85 See, e.g., MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELLE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 
25-27 (1996) (describing the stages of mediation to include “information gathering and 
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introductions and other preliminaries, the mediator often invites the parties 
to offer an opening presentation or narrative description of the origins and 
nature of the dispute.  This feature tracks Lipkin’s presentment stage of 
political justification.  The initial foray into the background dispute is often 
followed by an effort by the mediator to foster a common understanding 
among the parties about the nature of the dispute and the issues that need to 
be addressed, which parallels Lipkin’s reconstruction stage.  Next, in 
mediation, it is common to engage the parties in generating and analyzing 
available options and strategies for resolving the dispute, a task roughly 
analogous to the argument stage—though in mediation this frequently 
involves a problem-solving or cooperative effort, as opposed to an 
adversarial contest.  Then, finally, as with Lipkin’s judgment stage, their 
comes a time in mediation to decide on a course of action. 
Lipkin believes that the task of reconstruction is critical to creating a 
public discourse where people with differing (and even incommensurate) 
views about religion can nonetheless act deliberatively to decide important 
matters of law and policy.   Likewise, mediation, with its focus on creating 
understandings among parties holding differing views and concerns, offers 
perhaps the best means for resolving many religious land use disputes.86 As 
explained in Part I, the existing quasi-judicial system for resolving religious 
land use disputes lacks precisely this sort of opportunity for opponents to 
directly exchange views and engage in the hard work of dialogue.  In 
contrast, mediation allows the parties to talk directly with each other with 
the aid of a skilled neutral, and holds out the possibility of working through 
potentially divisive issues around religion.  Furthermore, if the issues are 
 
issue identification,” followed by “agenda setting,” then “resolving each issue,” and 
“reaching agreement”).  Cf. Richard M Cartier, Mediating Local Intergovernmental 
Disputes—Reflections on the Process, 13 San Joaquin Agricultural L. Rev. 1, 3-8 (2003) 
(describing the “classical” model of mediation as including:  a statement of the problem by 
the parties; information gathering; problem identification; problem solving; and writing of 
an agreement).  This basic structure is found as well in the final draft of the Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators being developed jointly by the American Bar 
Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for Conflict 
Resolution, available at http://www.acrnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards12-29-2004.pdf
(“Mediation serves various purposes, including opportunities for the parties to define and 
clarify issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess 
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements, when desired.”). 
86 There are mediators for whom, and forms of mediation in which, facilitating a 
dialogue between the disputants is not always encouraged and not thought to be crucial to 
the process.  See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-connected Mediation:  
What’s Justice Got to do with It?, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 787, 809-13 (2001) (describing the 
reduced role of disputants in court-connected mediation).  When I refer to mediation in this 
paper, however, I mean to suggest a process that includes an effort to create such a 
dialogue. 
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developed enough so that mediation can profitably occur prior to public 
hearings, they can be addressed before positions harden and the dispute 
becomes front-page fodder. 
Central to this argument is the understanding that mediation does 
not seek to exclude the idiosyncratic views of the participants about the 
history and nature of the dispute.87 The parties need not avoid talking about 
their respective religious beliefs, motivations, or aspirations.  Indeed, 
disputants will likely respond positively when they feel they have been 
genuinely heard and understood.88 A negotiation or mediation will often 
see little or no significant headway until one or more parties’ point of view 
has been at least acknowledged.89 
The point is crucial, as people with religious viewpoints may enter 
the mediation concerned that their views will not listened to or understood.  
They may believe, in the words of Stephen Carter, that their voices are not 
“welcome[d]…taken seriously, respected, and honored” in the debates over 
important public issues.90 Whether this true or not seems largely beside the 
point if the sentiment is widely shared.91 Because the national debates over 
 
87 Cf. R. Lisle Baker, Using Insights About Perception and Judgment from the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator Instrument as an Aid to Mediation, 9 Harv. Negot. L. Rev.115, 129-
30 (2004) (“The chance for parties to tell their stories as they prefer is a part of mediation’s 
value because disputants may not have the same chance in court.”) 
88 Cf. DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT 
MATTERS MOST 163 (Penguin Books 2000) (1999) (“[W]e [all] have a deep desire to feel 
heard, and to know that others care enough to listen.”).  See also BENNETT & HERMANN,
supra note 85, at 41 (“mediators must create an environment where feelings can be 
verbalized safely and the parties feel that they are heard and understood”). 
89 See Baker, supra note 87, at 130 (observing that “until these stories are told, it will 
be challenging for a party to move beyond them towards resolution.”).  After this point is 
reached, however, I agree with Professor Lipkin that people on both (or all) sides of the 
dispute have a duty, as a matter of “civic virtue,” to argue or explain themselves in terms—
in a language, even—that is accessible to the comprehension and analysis of those who do 
not share the speaker’s specific religious, moral, or philosophical commitments.  See 
Lipkin, supra note 32, at 2048. 
90 Wexler, supra note 70, at 189 (quoting STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN:
THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 42). But see Blumoff, supra note 69, at 
10, 14 (denying any empirical basis for such claims). 
91 Sometimes perception is reality, in other words.  However, I have found no studies 
regarding the prevalence of the belief among Americans that religious-based views are not 
welcomed in the so-called public square.  This might be a useful question to pursue.  For 
my purposes here, I assume with others that the widespread and frequent expression of this 
belief among religious elites and opinion makers has the intended impact of influencing 
grass level beliefs and attitudes, and that, in turn, it is likely to be reflected in religious land 
use disputes at the local level.  Cf. Schragger, supra note 8, at 1820 (observing that as 
national political debates involving religion have become more polarized, “local 
negotiations over religion’s place in public discourse have become increasingly difficult.”). 
See also, infra at note 93. 
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religion naturally find their way into the local discourse of communities and 
religious congregations,92 when land use disputes turn into claims of 
religious discrimination—as they will under RLUIPA—these same 
contentious dynamics will be likely in play.   
Should we care if differences over religion result in more acrimony 
down at city hall, or in the courthouse?  Isn’t that how democracy works? 
The next section argues that how we dispute matters, and that efforts to 
resolve religious land use conflicts through mediation can avoid or repair 
damaged relationships, leading to more robust communities. 
 
C.  Conflict and Community 
 
Religious land use disputes are primarily local conflicts over “the 
normative content of public life,” rather than simple reflections of larger 
social issues being played out on the national scene.93 And the choice of 
disputing process is important:  the manner and skillfulness with which it is 
employed, along with the substantive outcome, become feedback in the 
loop that continually shapes the evolving nature and quality of community 
life.94 
Community exists alongside liberty and equality as a fundamental—
if at times under appreciated—value in American democracy.95 
92 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 62, at 9 (“To the extent that the social issues concern 
religion directly—say, school prayers or religious exemptions from civil rights laws—our 
local religious congregations are natural loci for explicit discussion.”).  See also, infra note 
93. 
93 Schragger, supra note 8, at 1874.  Nonetheless, as infra, these national debates 
appear to influence the attitudes and beliefs of citizens at the local level. 
94 Ackerman, supra note 7, at 53-82 (comparing the impact on communities of 
litigation, arbitration, and mediation). Cf. Karst, supra note 62, at 24 (“Behavior is not just 
something in brute nature to be talked about and named; it has its own role in creating, 
reinforcing, or undermining meanings.”).  Professor Ackerman is careful to point out the 
instrumental nature of dispute resolution techniques:  “All dispute resolution processes 
have elements conducive to communitarianism, yet all such choices can be employed in a 
manner detrimental to building community.”  Ackerman, supra note 7, at 53.  He does not 
dismiss nor even denigrate the importance of litigation as a tool for resolving conflicts and 
providing other benefits for communities. Nor is his hope—or mine, for that matter—to 
simply reduce conflict by avoiding it; rather, encouraging mediation is meant to counter the 
lack of community engagement which itself may evidence a tendency towards conflict 
avoidance.  Id. at 40. 
95 Post, supra note 76, at 482 (“democracy presupposes community”); Lipkin, supra 
note 32, at 2029 n.17 (“[A]spiring towards ‘communitarian democracy’ is precisely, in my 
view, what prompted the Founding.”).  Lipkin elaborates on his notion as follows: 
[W]e might usefully regard the United States as aspiring towards an 
"American communitarian republic," consisting of a community of 
democrats committed to creating the conditions for the mutual 
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Relationships between individuals are the basic currency of communities of 
all types, providing the building blocks for the social networks that 
constitute a community’s lifeblood and identity.  Therefore, many social 
observers view with concern the decline in participation in community 
institutions and civic activities that, historically, have provided a major 
source of “social capital” in communities. 96 The fear is that declining 
stores of social capital will undermine the healthy functioning of local 
communities, both adversely affecting the quality of life for individuals in 
the community as well as constituting a drag on the greater polity.97 
Retaining the right to adjudicate such disputes is fundamental, of 
course.  Moreover, the existence of legal rights and the availability of 
formal adjudicatory processes to enforce them provide an important context 
 
recognition of each other's good. Essentially, the American 
communitarian republic consists of diverse individuals adhering to 
conflicting conceptions of the good life who recognize that individuality 
and diversity in part defines their political identities. The American 
communitarian republic examines the possibility that such individuals 
can form a community which protects their individuality and diversity 
and which fosters self-government and the commitment to the equal 
freedom of its members. The idea of the American communitarian 
republic explains community in terms of a reciprocal commitment to 
certain types of procedures for resolving social conflict and measuring 
change. One way of understanding these procedures is in terms of truth. 
On this view, truth is the result, often provisionally acknowledged, of 
interacting, especially through, but not limited to, deliberating with other 
members of the political community. We not only find truth through 
these interactions, but more important, the appropriate kinds of 
interactions with others constitute the nature of at least one important 
kind of truth, namely, political truth. 
Id. Lipken, then, also finds inherent meaning in the nature and quality of our 
social relationships, and not simply their products. 
96 Ackerman, supra note 7, at 28-29 (discussing the work of political scientist Robert 
Putnam, and defining social capital as “the connections between individuals that build 
social networks [and which are] seen as critical to the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that allow us to function in civil society.”). 
97 The position that, generally, the needs of community have lately been subjugated to 
the concerns of individual liberty is frequently identified with the communitarian 
movement or philosophy. Id. In his insightful article, Disputing Together:  Conflict 
Resolution and the Search for Community, Professor Ackerman draws upon the 
communitarian perspective to examine the impact of how we choose to dispute.  I draw on 
his work to argue that, in the case of religious land use disputes, communities will 
experience significant “centrifugal” (i.e., divisive) forces due to the likelihood, under the 
RLUIPA regime, that land owners with plausible religious motivations will choose (or at 
least threaten) to litigate rather than negotiate their conflicts with their neighbors and their 
community.  Id. at 55.  Thus, I share, to this extent, the communitarian concern about 
tending to the health of our civic communities.  For a broader and more detailed 
exploration of communitarian theory, however, I highly recommend Ackerman’s article. 
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for religious land use disputes and, more generally, for the broader range of 
community disputes.  For example, adjudication provides guidance or 
norms that reflect the broader sense of the community about the expected 
substantive outcome of disputes.98 Resort to adjudication is an affirmation 
of community values in so far as the parties place their dispute (and their 
faith) in the hands of community representatives, in the interest of resolving 
the matter peacefully.99 The handing down of decisions from an authority 
figure or figures, after a fair hearing, may also fit more easily currently 
popular conceptions of justice, so that traditional disputing methods may be 
imbued with a greater sense of legitimacy.  Lastly, authoritative 
interpretations of law are sometimes needed and may have a “cathartic” 
effect, even for losing parties.100 
Despite these virtues, adjudication in the American vein relies on 
adversarial assumptions that, on the whole, tend to separate people rather 
than build cooperative relationships and social capital.  The design of the 
formal litigation process—indeed, the very design of the courtroom—is 
intended to separate and “minimize engagement between the parties.”101 As 
discussed in Part I, the land use process, which is a form of local 
administrative adjudication, has inherited these assumptions and attributes 
of the adjudicatory model.  Thus, the land use process typically places 
stakeholders on an adversarial footing from the moment a project is 
proposed.  
Reliance on adversarial disputing can lead to a “self-absorbed 
preoccupation with individual rights to the derogation of community 
interests and needs.”102 The resulting “rights talk,” according to Mary Ann 
Glendon, “in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens 
social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, 
accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”103 Rights 
talk is precisely what predominates when disputes over the impacts of 
 
98 Post, supra note 76, at 477 (stating that an important function of law “is the 
articulation and enforcement of community norms.”).  In this sense, as the holder and 
vehicle for enforcement of such legal rights, communities serve as a “container for 
conflict.” Ackerman, supra note 7, at 47.  Cf., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale 
L. J. 1073, 1089 (1984) (arguing that civil litigation is “an institutional arrangement for 
using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”).  Indeed, its 
supporters may hope that RLUIPA, rather than resulting in a wave of litigation, instead 
brings about more favorable administrative zoning decisions for religious property owners 
that, in turn, reflect new community attitudes of religious tolerance. 
99 Ackerman, supra note 7, at 55-56. 
100 Id. at 58. 
101 Id. at 57.  
102 Id. at 56. 
103 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 14 (1991), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 7, at 56. 
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development are transformed into debates about religious values and 
beliefs.  A statute such as RLUIPA, designed to encourage this divisive 
dynamic, raises serious concerns both because of the public nature of the 
disputes and the potential they hold to broadly affect disputing behavior 
within the communities.104 As Kenneth Karst argues, the resulting discord 
“tends to perpetuate itself,”105 depleting community’s store of social capital.  
These are disputes that, literally, hit close to home.  Like disputes involving 
family, those between neighbors become overheated and personal very 
quickly.  Adding religion into that mix only makes things more volatile.   
The need to resolve religious land use disputes is in tension but not 
incompatible with the goal of strengthening community.106 Conflict is 
inevitable, but the disintegration of community bonds is not.  Indeed, how 
effectively residents respond to conflict is a measure of a community’s 
health.  Generally, an early intervention that allows neighbors to sit down 
together, to talk and listen to one another, and to deliberate about how to 
move forward, offers the hope of slowing the seemingly inevitable march to 
the (federal) courthouse.  Collaborative dispute resolution processes such as 
mediation offer that opportunity, and have greater potential not just to avoid 
depletion of social capital but to add to it, while also enhancing the 
problem-solving capacity of communities.107 
And so mediating religious land use disputes offers an opportunity 
to communities, but also a challenge.  For this suggestion to work, 
communities must accept the burden and responsibility of resolving their 
conflicts together, instead of resorting to the default of adversarial 
adjudication.108 Residents and local government officials will need to 
depart from established patterns and procedures, and commit their time, 
energy, and resources to perhaps unfamiliar collaborative processes.  
 
104 Ackerman, supra note 7, at 33-34 (arguing that land use disputes have “public 
implications” and “may have a broad substantive impact on the community”). 
105 Karst, supra note 62, at 16. 
106 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 7, at 37 (“The effort of individuals to resolve their 
disputes and the desire to reinforce the societal fabric are, more often then not, compatible 
goals.”). 
107 See id. at 71-72 (“The process can be inherently fulfilling, and can provide the 
parties with the tools to resolve future problems, develop relationships and build social 
capital.”).  Professor Ackerman insists “we delude ourselves if we think that adjudicative 
dispute resolution processes can serve as a surrogate for the types of community bonds that 
can be forged only in the absence of coercion.” Id. at 32.  He rightly cautions, however, 
that even mediation “requires conscious use of process in a manner conducive to personal 
interaction, mutual recognition, and a sense that the parties and their dispute are part of a 
larger tapestry,” lest it fall into a “self-indulgent” and “empty ritual.”  Id. at 30-31. 
108 As Professor Ackerman states succinctly, “collaboration can be hard work.”  Id. at 
72. 
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Effective mediation demands patience, maturity, flexibility, and openness to 
opportunities for mutual accommodation. 
This may be a tall order for many communities.  Adversarial 
strategies are a powerful habit for individuals, institutions, and for 
communities as well.  Adjudication to many seems like the “natural” way to 
resolve disputes.  For some, it will be easier to ask a judge to decide who is 
right and who is wrong.  Indeed, one attraction of both litigation and 
administrative land use proceedings is that they shift responsibility for 
resolving the conflict away from the disputants.  For local government 
officials, mindful of the political costs of making hard choices, the 
temptation to “punt” a problem to the courts may be irresistible.   
In contrast, mediation requires that disputants—including the local 
zoning officials—take responsibility for finding a solution themselves.  And 
this autonomy is precisely the foremost advantage of mediation.  After all, 
those closest to the dispute are often in a better position to resolve it, simply 
because they are the driving force and they know best what their own needs 
and interests require.109 When disputants “own” the process, it stands to 
reason that they will embrace the fruits of their efforts, thus enhancing 
legitimacy and compliance. 
To summarize, mediation can empower community members to 
participate in productive civic engagements, which should yield benefits in 
the form of increased social capital and a better overall quality of individual 
and communal life.110 Changing in this way how individuals and 
 
109 Id. at 75 (“People usually are better equipped to order their lives and resolve their 
problems on their own accord.”). 
110 Id. at 80 (“the true promise of mediation…involves a process of empowerment and 
recognition that shifts disputants from weakness and dependency to strength, from self-
absorption to responsiveness.”). Professor Schragger likewise cites the importance for 
communal life of constructive public disputing at the local level: 
 The strength of the civic community is that it generates crosscutting 
communal norms through a public and democratic process, and that it 
does so on behalf of citizens, not just private parties.  There is powerful 
value to fostering the negotiation of public values in this type of 
association. Indeed, commentators express alarm that the legal and 
philosophical favoring of private associational life over public 
associational life is corrosive of civic engagement.  Those who believe 
that participation in the process of governing is essential to a well-
functioning democracy view the decrease in local civic role as 
particularly dangerous to the republic, a sign of the decay of democratic 
virtue. This ideal places civic engagement at the center of individual 
virtue, and views the norms of citizenship as central to achievement of 
the good life. Bypassing those public institutions that are well-scaled for 
participatory activity narrows the space for the public negotiation of 
communal values and shifts those debates into the private sphere. 
Schragger, supra note 8, at 1887-88 (footnotes omitted). 
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communities view and attempt to resolve their conflicts can change the very 
culture of that community.  It is in local settings and through local 
institutions that individual identity and character are most powerfully 
influenced.111 Indeed, it is precisely in the content and form of 
communications within families, congregations, and communities—what 
Professor Karst refers to as “local discourse”—that we learn and embody 
disputing behaviors, and other aspects of culture: 
If a culture is a community of meaning, local discourse is the 
port of entry into that community.  The conversations and 
other communicative interactions of ordinary life are, from 
childhood on, the stuff of world-making.  Language is part of 
this discourse, but we also communicate meanings—our 
understandings of the world, our intentions, our convictions, 
our capacities—by our actions.  We learn to assign meanings 
to our own behavior and to others’ behavior, and all these 
assignments of meaning add up to the culture in which we 
live.112 
In other words, if we are to build communities that dispute well, we must do 
so from the ground up.   Similar notions undergird other community-centric 
forms of dispute resolution such as victim-offender mediation and 
community boards.113 Like those initiatives, however, use of mediation in 
land use disputes generally, much less religious land use disputes, has yet to 
gain widespread acceptance.  What, then, are the obstacles to realizing the 
potential benefits of mediation?  Part IV explores this question, and offers 
recommendations for overcoming these barriers.   
 
IV.  POTENTIAL OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS TO MEDIATION 
111 Karst, supra note 62, at 2-5. 
112 Karst, supra note 62, at 3.  Corporate America is discovering the power of local 
discourse, and some companies have developed “word of mouth” marketing campaigns, 
involving the targeted recruitment of volunteer consumers who are provided free samples 
of products and asked to (surreptitiously) let friends and acquaintances know about their 
experiences with them. See Rob Walker, The Hidden (In Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. 
Times, December 5, 2004, Section 6, at 69, available at 2004 WLNR 13102193. 
113 See, e.g., Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production:  
The Making of Community Mediation, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 709, 714-723 (1988) 
(reviewing the history of community dispute resolution centers and identifying their 
primary purposes as being the delivery of dispute resolution services, transformation of 
society, and personal growth).  See also PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, COMMUNITY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE 
OF A MOVEMENT 19 (2004) (analogizing the benefits of a community dispute resolution 
program to an iceberg, in that only 10% is visible in the delivery of services, but that 90% 
of the benefit, in the form of community empowerment, is obscured from view). 
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Resolving religious land use disputes presents a difficult challenge 
for local communities, due both to the religious content and to the 
shortcomings of existing land use procedures.  Mediation is not an easy 
alternative, however, nor does it represent an unalloyed good.  To borrow 
Archbishop Tutu’s metaphor for religion, any dispute resolution technique 
is like a knife:  equally useful to create a feast, or to disembowel an 
adversary.114 Disputants should give careful consideration to advantages 
and disadvantages before choosing an available dispute resolution option.115 
With this in mind, this part examines the likely concerns and obstacles to 
using mediation in the context of a religious land use dispute. 
First, the existing culture of local government may pose a significant 
obstacle to implementing mediation.  It is not easy to change the habits and 
beliefs of an organization, and bureaucracies—including those at the local 
government level—can be especially resistant to change.  In two decades of 
advising parties on all sides of local land use disputes, the author has not 
seen a significant shift towards more collaborative models of decision-
making.116 While commentators have often endorsed the use of mediation 
in land use disputes,117 local officials may be reluctant to consider it, fearing 
a loss of influence over the decision making process.118 
114 Arlene Getz, ‘Religion is Morally Neutral’: Desmond Tutu Discusses the Tsunami 
Tragedy, God, Iraq and the Ee-election of George W. Bush, Newsweek, December 30, 
2004 (web edition, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6769686/site/newsweek/)
(last checked April 5, 2006).   Here is the full quote: 
I keep having to remind people that religion in and of itself is 
morally neutral. Religion is like a knife. When you use a knife for cutting 
up bread to prepare sandwiches, a knife is good. If you use the same 
knife to stick into somebody’s guts, a knife is bad. Religion in and of 
itself is not good or bad—it is what it makes you do. 
115 Commentators, of course, should likewise take care in prescribing any particular 
approach, and that is the underlying purpose of present article. 
116 An exception to this general observation may be in the area of long-range 
community planning, where local governments have begun to convene facilitated 
community-wide processes that bring together stakeholder groups in an effort to develop 
and achieve consensus about future goals and aspirations.  I have not seen a similar shift in 
local government thinking in the area of resolving disputes.  There is some movement in 
the developer community, however, which increasingly includes collaborative techniques 
among its best practices for development proposals.  See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 30, at 
525 (recommending that developers use mediation for difficult or controversial land use 
proposals). 
117 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Golden and its Emanations:  The Surprising Origins of 
Smart Growth, 35 Urb. Law. 15, 72-3 (2003) (calling for continued encouragement of 
mediation in connection with other “smart growth” urban planning strategies). 
118 See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 241-42 (1987) (pointing out 
that public officials usually retain decision making authority, and that consensual processes 
will likely enhance their power because the public favors the better outcomes that these 
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Nonetheless, the highly contested nature of religious land use 
disputes may eventually encourage local officials to try mediation.  For one 
thing, local officials’ natural aversion to making unpopular decisions could 
lead them to loosen their control over the decision-making process.  Indeed, 
fear of blame might lead a zoning official to make a decision he or she 
thinks is popular with large numbers of voters, even where the decision is 
questionable as a legal matter and there is exposure to costly litigation.119 
Mediation effects a sharing of responsibility for the process—and, 
therefore, the result—among those most directly interested in the dispute.  If 
local officials believe that mediation can result in a solution acceptable to 
all parties involved, they may be very happy indeed to adopt it in their own 
formal decision on the matter. 
Another likely obstacle to choosing mediation is the lack of 
resources for new programs at the local government and community level.  
With so many competing demands for services, and a political climate that 
makes finding new revenue sources exceedingly difficult, local 
governments have been suffering from financial difficulty and uncertainty 
for many years now.  While, in a sense, it is a matter of reconsidering 
priorities, local governments can be shy about launching new initiatives in 
an era where securing adequate funding for even basic services has become 
difficult.  It may be possible to convince public officials that there are 
community-building benefits to collaborative dispute resolution methods, or 
even that it could save them money on legal costs if they avoid litigation, 
but there will be for many a natural inclination to stay the course.   
The issue of cost savings is a challenging one because the existing 
system of processing land use disputes can and often appears to be very 
efficient.  It is difficult to imagine, for example, a controversial religious 
land use dispute being resolved through mediation in just one evening 
session.  Yet, many public hearings on land use matters are concluded in 
that time.  Moreover, because employing mediation does not avoid the need 
to process land use applications in accord with basic administrative 
procedures, nor replace the public hearing, mediation might appear to be an 
expensive “add on.”   
Also, the traditional administrative procedures serve important 
purposes and are legally required in most instances.  They operate 
structurally to retain the ultimate locus for decision making in a 
democratically constituted and accountable local government, and provide a 
context of public values that must be the background for such disputes.120 
processes provide). 
119 This, of course, is a concern for minority faith communities, who fear exclusion by 
mainline religious and secular interests through zoning decisions. 
120 Thus mediation is best viewed, in the words of Professor Susskind, as “an important 
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Religious land use disputes involve public as well as private interests, and 
the overlay of a public process, along with the involvement of public 
officials, is necessary for the success of the mediation and to provide an 
important element of legitimacy.121 
Mediation, then, may be resisted because of its potential to increase 
costs in terms of the time and resources devoted to the process by local 
government and other interested parties, and in terms of the costs and 
associated overhead for the mediator and the mediation process itself.  For 
the property owner, the holding costs of the land could add up quickly, or 
financial options may lapse, if a decision is much prolonged by negotiation 
and mediation efforts.  Yet there appear to be real cost savings possible 
from cooperative decision making, not the least of which is avoiding 
consultant and legal fees prior to and during litigation, which may quickly 
render insignificant the costs of the mediation process.  There is also the 
social capital and community good will to be gained when citizens work 
collaboratively to solve problems that implicate mutual concerns. 
Aside from costs, there must also be concern that mediation of this 
sort not be used to avoid public scrutiny.  Almost all jurisdictions have open 
meeting laws, public records requirements, and conflict of interest 
regulations; it is no less important to comport with the public values 
represented by these types of statutes when resolving a public dispute using 
mediation than with other public processes.  These forms of official 
transparency and accountability, too, will increase the legitimacy of any 
agreement reached through mediation. 
A final significant concern about recommending mediation in the 
case of religious land use disputes is that it might be used to disadvantage 
non-mainstream groups and individuals who do not hold to more 
conventional religious views or practices.  To repeat: the instrumental 
nature of mediation will not prevent its use for less than admirable 
purposes.122 Any recommendation of mediation must respond to the 
concern that the process does not become a vehicle for oppression of 
minority interests or views, or for the denial of fundamental rights.   
 
supplement to the traditional administrative, political and legal tools typically used to 
resolve land use disputes.” See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., CONSENSUS BUILDING 
INSTITUTE, USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDE FOR 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 1 (1999).  The main thrust of the present article, then, is that mediation 
appears to be particularly appropriate in the case of religious land use disputes. 
121 Cf., DAVID LAMPE & MARSHALL KAPLAN, RESOLVING LAND-USE CONFLICTS 
THROUGH MEDIATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND 
POLICY WORKING PAPER 2 (1999) (analyzing eight case studies of land use mediation and 
concluding that the failure to involve elected and appointed officials could “prolong a 
dispute-resolution process substantially and unnecessarily.”). 
122 See supra note 94, note 114 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mediation holds particular promise for communities facing religious 
land use disputes, though care must be taken to ensure it is used 
appropriately.   Thus, it is important that a party’s decision to enter into and 
participate in mediation is well informed, as well as voluntary and not even 
subtly coerced.  Public officials or employees representing the decision 
making body should avoid any suggestion that the refusal of a party or 
person to participate in mediation will be held against them in subsequent 
proceedings.  Also, mediation must not be a substitute for, nor a prerequisite 
(and thus an additional barrier) to, an official decision by the decision 
making body, or for obtaining judicial review.  While such requirements 
may encourage people to try mediation, they may also discourage or deny 
legitimate expectations of access to governmental process and decisions.  
Nor should any persons or organizations be excluded from mediation or 
deprived of any information gathered in that process because they lack the 
ability to pay a share of the costs.  In summary, mediation should not be an 
impediment to achieving a fair and just resolution.  
There will be instances in which the need to vindicate rights through 
litigation outweighs the benefits obtainable through mediation.  In rare 
cases, the parties will need to protect fundamental interests that cannot be 
compromised.  At other times, the parties will simply not be able or willing 
to accommodate each other.  For these reasons and others, access to 
administrative and judicial forums must be preserved.   Similarly, there will 
likely be disputes in the near term in which important questions about the 
scope and effect of RLUIPA remain unresolved by the courts, leaving the 
parties unable to make good decisions about settlement.  Relatively more 
cases will require litigation at this early stage in the statute’s history, as 
some number of cases must go through the appeal process in order to shape 
the legal landscape and set the parameters of parties’ reasonable 
expectations, thus conducing settlement of later claims.123 
Despite its promise, there are likely to be political and practical 
obstacles to employing mediation at the local level.  Perhaps ironically, the 
best strategy for overcoming these obstacles—at least in any programmatic 
fashion—may be to focus at the state level.124 State government authority 
 
123 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979) (arguing that parties’ expectations 
about possible litigated outcomes influence bargaining behavior). 
124 While land use is largely controlled at the local level, often the statutory authority 
for local regulation will be grounded in state law.  In general, cities, counties, and other 
local government subdivisions are creatures of the state, thus states can and do legislate in 
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over the local zoning function provides the opportunity to encourage or 
direct parties to consider mediation in these cases.  This can easily 
overcome the resistance of local officials who are unfamiliar with or wary 
of employing a new dispute resolution strategy.  And, in general, state 
governments are in a much better position to secure the resources necessary 
to support a mediation effort, either directly or by providing grants to local 
government or non-profit community mediation centers for this purpose.   
Another reason for state-level coordination is the relative lack of 
trained mediators.  Multi-party disputes are a specialty in the dispute 
resolution field, and relatively few mediators have the appropriate training 
and experience to serve as neutrals in such disputes.  Experience with land 
use, and a demonstrated familiarity with or sensitivity to the concerns of 
religious groups or individuals, may also be desirable qualities, and further 
limit the pool of available mediators.  Some communities do have active 
community mediation programs, and it is possible that candidates will be 
found close to home.  As the use of mediation and other dispute resolution 
increases over time, it may be possible for local government agencies to 
develop in-house expertise, and to create along with other local agencies a 
shared pool of mediators, allowing one agency to “lend” the services of an 
in-house mediator to another agency when disputes arise.125 At a minimum, 
a statewide clearinghouse function to aid communities in identifying 
potential mediators would itself be highly useful. 
Many states already have a state-level office of dispute resolution, 
which provide a natural locus for coordinating funding, administration, and 
perhaps even oversight of local mediation efforts.  These offices could act 
as resources to advise parties about dispute resolution options, and could 
train, provide, or recommend mediators.  A state-level office could also 
review state law and even local regulations to identify any barriers to the 
use of mediation, and recommend changes to those laws.126 It might also be 
very helpful for legislators and other public officials, and the public itself, 
to have good data about religious land use disputes.  A state-level office of 
dispute resolution could provide tracking, analysis, and reporting functions 
 
both procedural and substantive areas of land use regulation. 
125 I thank John Lande for suggesting this possibility, and for pointing out that a similar 
system of shared neutrals already exists among federal agencies. 
126 The tremendous variability of land use regulatory regimes makes any specific 
recommendations for legislative or regulatory change impractical in the context of this 
article.  It will be important, in the context of a particular dispute, to examine applicable 
laws and regulations, and identify what impediments they may pose for the use of 
mediation.  For example, authorizing legislation of some sort may be required to authorize 
deviation from established procedures and to permit the use of mediation in some states, or 
in some local jurisdictions.  City attorneys and other local government counsel are likely to 
be in the best position to undertake such an analysis. 
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with respect to these disputes, functions that are commonly found at the 
state level.   In summary, whether employing prescriptive regulations or 
incentives, any programmatic effort to encourage mediation in religious 
land use disputes is more likely to be effective if implemented on a 
statewide basis, since only the largest cities or metropolitan areas would be 
able to sustain their own programs.   
In the end, however, it will not be enough to simply provide the 
process for resolving these disputes.  Mediation’s value is instrumental, and 
there must be persons of good will on all sides of a dispute who bring open 
minds and open hearts to the task of engaging in a dialogue about their 
differences.  Happily, such qualities are a prominent concern in the ethical 
teachings of all major religious traditions as well as other philosophical 
traditions.  They might be referred to collectively as the “ethic of 
reciprocity.”127 
In the Christian gospels, Jesus is questioned on the matter of living a 
holy life: 
[A]nd one of them, a lawyer, asked him a question to test 
him.  “Teacher, which commandment in the law is the 
greatest?”  [Jesus] said to him, ”’You shall love the Lord 
your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and 
with all your mind.’  This is the greatest and first 
commandment.  And a second is like it:  ‘You shall love 
your neighbor as yourself.’  On these two commandments 
hang all the law and all the prophets.”128 
Through this exchange, the gospel narrative draws into dynamic tension two 
separate injunctions from the Hebrew Scriptures.129 When read together in 
this manner, they offer a spacious and adaptable standard for right conduct 
in everyday life.130 From a dualistic perspective the twin commandments 
 
127 For a quick survey of this “ethic of reciprocity” in other world religions and other 
major philosophical systems, see the website of Ontario Consultants for Religious 
Tolerance, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/reciproc.htm (last visited April 5, 2006). 
128 Matthew 22:35-40 (New Revised Standard Version) (all subsequent citations are to 
this version).  See, also, Mark 12:38-41; Luke 10:25-37.  Cf. Romans 13:8-10 (“Owe no 
one anything, except to love one another; for the one who loves another has fulfilled the 
law.  The commandments, ‘You shall not murder; You shall not steal; You shall not covet’; 
and any other commandment, are summed up in this word, ‘Love your neighbor as 
yourself.’  Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law.”); 
Galatians 5:14 (same); James 2:8 (same). 
129 Deuteronomy 6:5 (“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with 
all your soul, and with all your might.”), and Leviticus 19:18 (“you shall love your 
neighbor as yourself”).   
130 This passage, through its radical reductionism, might be seen as a rebuke to a 
tradition of legalistic interpretations of scripture.  However, there was already by this time 
a tradition of scholarship associated with the Talmudic sage Rabbi Hillel that had produced 
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might seem paradoxical, but from a third eminently practical perspective, 
the resulting tension forms a crucible for living a moral life in the context of 
a diverse community. 
Arguably, the burden of this declaration is that all life is lived in the 
context of relationship—relationship with one’s own existential or religious 
commitments, but also relationship with the human and nonhuman world 
with which we are inextricably interconnected.  Philosopher and theologian 
Martin Buber explored similar territory in his philosophy of dialogue, 
famously declaring that, “All real living is meeting.”131 Mediation, as 
conceived in this article, provides a form and forum for the gathering of 
persons who are in conflict with one another.  It offers the parties to a 
religious land use dispute an opportunity to “come to the table,” to engage 
in dialogue, and to seek resolution—even, perhaps, reconciliation—in the 
very space that divides them:  the place of meeting.132 That space between 
disputants is the location of what conflict resolution experts call the Third 
 
an identical formulation:  “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor; that is the 
whole Torah, the rest is commentary; go and learn it.” See Talmud, Shabbat 31a (quoted in 
THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE 43 New Testament (3rd ed. 2001).  A similar 
reductionism characterizes classical Zen koan literature.  In one koan, for example, a monk 
asks a Zen master to summarize everything the Buddha taught during the course of his 45-
year teaching career.  The master replied, simply, “An appropriate statement.”  THE BLUE 
CLIFF RECORD 94 (Thomas Cleary & J.C. Cleary trans., 1992). This deft stroke, too, was 
intended perhaps as a rebuke by the partisans of Zen, whose nascent Buddhism was deeply 
intertwined with native Taoist beliefs, to distance themselves from the heavily 
intellectualized and systematic tradition of Indian Buddhist thought that accompanied 
Buddhism’s arrival in China.  Like the Golden Rule, this classic Zen formulation offers a 
simple yet profound ethic, unburdened by centuries of tradition and scholarship, but 
capable of providing guidance for one’s actions in every circumstance.  
131 MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 11 (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., Charles Scribner’s 
Sons 2d ed. 1958), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 7, at 28.  Mediator Gary Gill-Austern 
describes Buber’s conception of dialogue this way:   
Buber tells us that human beings have a twofold attitude to the 
world. The individual, the “I,” exists in relationships characterized as I-It 
and I-Thou.  The I-It describes our relations with nature and people in the 
everyday; it is where we dwell most of the time.  In the I-It, the I sees the 
subjects of its perception as “other” and available for its utilitarian needs.  
In this relationship, the “I” is primary, if not “all.”  In contrast, the I-
Thou describes a relation of mutuality, where neither I is primary.  In 
some sense, therefore, the I in the I-Thou is different from the I in the I-
It.  In the I-Thou, each I enters the “between” to meet the other, the Thou.  
The place of meeting—the between—is where the I and the Thou engage 
in dialogue. 
Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 343, 351-52 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted). 
132 See Gill-Austern, supra note 131, at 352.  Buber’s use of the term “meeting” was 
not limited to actual dialogues between people, but his broader metaphorical sense of the 
term certainly included the more literal case, as suggested here. 
42 MEDIATING RELIGIOUS LAND USE DISPUTES   [4/5/2006 
Story, 133 or the Mediative Perspective:134 the outlook of a disinterested and 
neutral third party—such as a mediator—who is not being asked to decide 
the dispute, has no stake in the outcome, is unconcerned with assigning 
moral responsibility or blame, but is simply interested in helping the parties 
resolve the dispute themselves.   
Again, it is not enough to simply offer this space.  Success in 
mediation will require an effort by the parties to simultaneously consider 
their own interests along side the interests of their neighbors and their 
community.  It will require a stance towards the dispute that acknowledges 
the importance of the underlying civic relationship, and the intertwining of 
one’s own interests with the interests of others.135 For the religious-minded, 
such disputes may even function as a crucible for one’s religious practice, 
providing the opportunity to cultivate wisdom and compassion.  For others 
perhaps more community-minded than religious, an equivalent opportunity 
for moral growth and understanding would be presented. 
A resolution achieved through mediation no more guarantees that 
the “right” or “correct” result will be reached any more than does a court or 
jury trial.  Rather, a community’s choice to mediate a religious land use 
dispute elevates certain process values—the democratic ideals of dialogue 
and deliberation, along with community building—in the effort to resolve 
the dispute.  This effort through mediation to consciously engage the 
tension of competing interests, done in the spirit of civic virtue, offers a 
clear alternative to both administrative land use adjudication and to 
litigation.  Mediation, in this view, offers a free and diverse people the 
 
133 See STONE, ET. AL., supra note 88, at 149-155 (“In addition to your story and the 
other person’s story, every difficult conversation includes an invisible Third Story.  The 
Third Story is the one a keen observer would tell, someone with no stake in your particular 
problem.”) 
134 See GARY J. FRIEDMAN ET AL., SAVING THE LAST DANCE: MEDIATION THROUGH 
UNDERSTANDING (videotape, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and The 
Center for Mediation in Law). 
135 The effort to find an appropriate resolution in the face of competing interests is also 
very much at the heart of our system of justice.  Benjamin Cardozo described justice as:  
a concept far more subtle and indefinite than any that is yielded by 
mere obedience to a rule.  It remains to some extent, when all is said and 
done, the synonym of an aspiration, a mood of exaltation, a yearning for 
what is fine or high...Perhaps we shall even find at times that when 
talking about justice, the quality we have in mind is charity.…   
FRED R. SHAPIRO, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 231 
(Oxford University Press 1993).  Justice Cardozo, in this evocation of the Golden Rule, 
meant to describe a transcendent value.  But the underlying premise—that predetermined 
rules, attitudes and responses may not always be of great value, or may even be harmful, in 
the context of a particular dispute—contains the seeds of an eminently practical view of 
dispute resolution.  Indeed, a responsive ad hoc approach to conflict is virtually 
synonymous, for some, with the techniques and strategies associated with mediation. 
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opportunity to overcome the differences that sometimes painfully divide 
them, and work to determine their own destiny—together. 
 
